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THt UNANI.lvHTY NORlV! IN DELA'NAR E
CORPORATE LAW
David A. Skeel, Jr.·
INTRODUCTION

O

VER the last several decades, the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court have issued an increasing number of
separate opinions. It is not at all uncommon fo r there to be
three or more opinions in a single case, particularly when controversial issues are decided. Nor is this tendency limited to the
Supreme Court. 1 One sees similar, though less dramatic, trends
in appellate courts throughout the country.
Things were not always this way. In the early years of the Supreme Court, John Marshall quite deliberately rejected the
English tradition of issuing seriatim opinions and helped to establish a practice of producing a single opinion in each case.2
IVIany observers believe that speaking with a single voice greatly

·Associate Professor o f Law, Te mp le Un ivers ity. I am gra teful to Michael Dool ey,
Mik e Klarman, Saul Levmo re, Jim Lin dgren , Geoff Mi ll e r, E d Rock, Max Stearns,
and Te d White for helpful commen ts and co nv ersations, an d owe special th a nk s to
Chief Justice Norman Veasey, Ju stice Randy Holl a nd and De laware Supreme Co urt
Adm inistrator Steve Taylor for extre mely hel pfu l disc ussions on the workings of
Delaware's supreme court. T hey of course should no t be see n as endorsing any o f
the vi e ws I set forth in th e Artic le . I wou ld also iik e to thank the Olin Foundation for
ge ne rous funding during a semeste r visitorshi p at th e U niv e rsity of Virginia School o f
Law a nd Temple Law Schoo! for gene rous summer funding.
1 T hroughout th e Articl e, I ca pitali ze "S upre me Court" a nd "Court" when referring to the U nited Sta tes Supreme Co urt , an d I use lower case whe n referring to th e
De lawa re "supreme court" in order to minimize co nfu sion. Likewise, I capitali ze
"J ustice" when referring to me mbers of the Supreme Co urt , !:l nd use the lowe r case
"justice" when referring to members of the supreme court.
2
See, e.g., Herbert A. Johnson, Introduction: T he Busine ss of the Court, in 2 The
O liver Wendell Holmes Dev ise History of the Supre me Court of the United States:
Foundations of Power: Jo hn Marsha ll, 1801-15 , at 373, 380-81 (Paul A. Freund ed.,
1981); Meredith Kolsky, Note, Justice William Johnson and the History of the
Sup re me Court Dissent, 83 Geo. L.J. 2069,2073-75 (1995).
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enhanced the credibility of a Court that h ad previously been
dismissed as ineffectu al an d blatantly political. 3
Although the strong pattern of unanimity had weakened
4
somewhat by th e end of M arshall's tenure as Chief Justice , the
writing of sep arate opinions was discouraged on many appellate
courts throughou t the nineteenth centu ry and into the early
twentieth century. Onl y if a judge fe lt extraordinarily strongly
about an issue was he likely to write separately. By the 1940s,
the picture looked entirely differ ent , with judges authoring
separate opinions almost as a matter of course, particularly in
cases that rai sed controversial issues. 5 Th us, when the Supreme
Court made a point of issuing unanimous decisions in several
important desegregation cases, 6 the Court's unanimity seemed
all the more striking.
See Kolsky, supra note 2 , a t 2075-76 (reviewing commentators).
-' Justice W illi a m Johnson is often cited as ha ving reintroduced no nunanimity in
the Supre me Court. Jo hnson was appo inted by Presid e nt Jefferso n, who stro ngl y
opposed the Supreme Court's practi ce of un a nimity, a nd who urged John so n to write
separately. Id . at 2078-79; see also Le tter fro m T ho mas J efferso n to William John so n
(Oct. 27, 1822), in 12 The Works Of T homas J effe rso n 246, 249-50 (PaulL. Forded .,
1905) (contending that se riatim op inions are far mo re effective a t holdin g judges
individuall y acco unta bl e, be ca us e judges can hid e b e hind the fa<;ade of un a nimous
op inions).
5 There is no obv ious e xp la nation as to why th e urge fo r un a nimity di sappeared .
A t th e Supreme Co urt leve l, it seems lik e ly that the increasing complexity of th e
issues that made th eir way to th e Court may have be e n o ne factor, and that th e
de clin e and eventual rejection of natural law th eories was a no th e r. See, e .g., Karl M.
ZoBe l! , Division o f Op ini o n in the Supre me Court: A History of Judici al
D isi ntegrati o n, 44 Cornell L.Q. 186, 202-03 (1959) (s ugges ting that a side effect of
Hol mes' role in the " destructio n of the myth of judicia l ce rta inty" was the creation of
th e id ea that each judge 's view of a case is equally plausib le , which encouraged th e
proliferation of separa te op ini ons) . For ev idence of the magn itude of the shift in th e
Supreme Court, see id . at 205 tbl. I (showing that onl y 11% of th e Co urt's opinions in
1930 were non unanimo us, but that thi s percentage rose to we ll over half by 1943, and
was over 70% for most o f the 1950s).
6 In Brown v. Board of Ed uca ti on, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), C hi ef Justi ce Warren
succeed ed in pers uadi ng all of the members of the Court to join his opinion rev ersin g
the "se pa rate but eq ual " doctrin e of Pless y v. Fe rgus on, 163 U.S. 537 (1 896) . A nd , in
Coope r v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958), th e Justices iss ued a coa uthored , unanimous
op ini o n reaffirmin g th eir commitme nt to B row n in the fa ce o f overt res ist a nce in
Arka nsas . T he J ustices viewed un a nimity as crucial to underscoring th e ir commitme nt to desegregatio n, a nd to heading off the risk tha t recalcitrant So uthern sta tes
wou ld seize on a di ssent as a mea ns o f co ntinuing the ir oppos iti o n. Perhaps th e best
acco unt of Chi ef Justice Warre n 's effort s to insure unanimity in Bro wn , and of th e
percei ved importance of prese nting a united front , is Richard Kluger, Simpl e Justice:
3
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The proliferation of separate opinions has produced a great
deal of hand-wringing in some q uarters. Critics of the apparent
fragmentation insist that writing sep arately tends to un de rmine
the collegiality of a court and, at its worst, can erode the legitimacy of the court's pro:nouncem ents. 7 Other com m e nt ators, although emphasizing the need to main tain j1·dicial civility, h ave
defende d the value of se-oarate ooin ions . These critics ar 0o-ue
"
"
that dissenting and concurring o pinions force the rn aj ority to
sharpen
both i~ he limitations of the rna. its focus, and can si£mal
'-'
jority's analysis and the lik eli hood th at the decision will , or at
least may, be overruled at a later date .8
What neither the critics nor the pr oponents of writing separately have notice d is that an important state supreme co urt
stands in striking contrast to the current pattern. The D elaware
supreme court, which has long been recognized as our preeminent authority on state corporation law, rarely issues separate
opinions. Even on deeply controversial issues, such as those
that arose during the takeover wave of the 1980s, Delaware 's
justices almost invariably speak with a single voice.
Although it is perhaps un derstandable that Supreme Court
scholars have not noticed the Delaware supreme court's penchant for unanimity, corporate law scholars seem not to have
picked up on it either. Corporate law comment ators have analyzed and debated Delaware 's role in corporate law for decades,
T he History of Brown v. Board of E du cacion a nd Black America's Struggle fo r
E quality 679-99 (1975). For another examp le of Supreme Cou rt un ani mity in addressing a se nsitive iss ue , see U nited States v. Nixon, 418 U .S. 683 (1974) (Nixon
tapes case).
7
See, e.g., Ruth Bader G insb urg, R emarks on Writing Separately, 65 Was h. L.
Rev. 133, 138-45 (1990) (su ggesting that Un ited States judges sh o uld exercise more
res tra int before writing separately); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis
a nd Reform 236-43 (1985) (arguing that although it would be "a great error to
suppress" separate opinions, in so me cases, separa te op ini o ns can " comm unicate a
se ns e of the law's instability th at is mis leadi ng"); Z o Bel! , supr a note 5, at 211-14
(suggesting judges should consider the und esira bl e effects o f dissenting as well as the
reasons for disse nt); id. at 203 n.98 (citing other literature on the " problem" of
separate opinions).
s See, e.g., Wi lliam J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of D isse nts, 37 Hastings L.J. 427
(1986); Edward McG lynn Gaffney, J r. , T h e Importance o f D isse nt a nd the
Imperative of Judicial Civili ty, 28 Va l. U. L. Rev. 583 (1994); Kolsky, supra note 2, at
2082-87; see also Kevin M. Stack, Note, Th e Practice of D issent in the Supre me
Co urt, 105 Ya le L.J. 2235 (1996) (arguing that the practice of dissent is justified no t in
terms of th e rule of law, but in terms of ideals of deliberative democracy).
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yet none has fully acco unted for this crucial component of the
judicial process. 9
My purpose in this Articl e is to explore in detail the implications of the D elaware su preme court's tendency to issue u nani mous ODinions-a oractice I will refer to as De laware 's
'
.
•.
.
"10 '.--, .
.
·'unammrty
norm.
· 'u1ven t 'ne a b sence o,_f pnor
co m mentary on
the unanimity norm , I begin, in P art I, by showing th e e xtertt to
which Dela;,vare 's decisions are in fact overwhelmingly unani m ous. I th en describe the practices that seem to ma ke unan imity possible in Deiaware in an era when so few other rnod ern
courts are characterized by a unanimous decisionmaking process.
Part II ex plores the effects of unanimity on the de velopment
of D elaware corporate law doctrine. My initial ass essment emphasizes what on the surface appears to be a particul arly troublesome consequence of the unanimity norm, as compared to a
nonunanimity regime. Drawing from the extensive recent li terature on soci al choice, I argue that unanimity magnifies the likelihood of "cycling" and cycling-like effects-that is, of shifts by
the supreme court from one doctrin al approach to another. 11 I
illustrate this concern with an example based on, and in many
respects exemplified by, a series of unanimously decided Delaware takeover cases. rv1y conclusion that unanimit y magnifies
the risk of cycling raises the question of why, given its effects,
the unanimity norm is likely to have evolved and survived. T he
obvious answer, that D elaware's unanimity norm reinforces the
credibility of the supreme court, does not seem especially help-

9
l am aware of only on e law review article that eve n mentions Delawa re's
tendency to speak with a unanimous vo ice. See Jeffrey N. Gordo n. Corpo.-ations,
Mark e ts, and Co urts, 91 Colum. L. R e v. 1931, 1968-69 (1991) (alluding to th e fact
that Delaware's takeover case s have bee n co nsisten tl y unanimou s).
' 0 I us e th e term " norm" som ewh a t ad vi sed ly , giv e n the burgeoning litera ture o n
norm s in legal scholarship. In describing an as pect of Delaware supreme co urt
decisionmaking as a norm, I emp loy the term more broadly than those w ho treat
norm s as necessa ril y nonlegal in nature. For an excellent introduction to the current
legal literature on norms, see Symposium , Law, Eco nomics , & Norm s, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1643 (1996).
" The problem of cycling also is re ferred to as the "Co ndorce t Paradox ," a ft er th e
French mathem a ticia n and phil osopher Marquis de Co ndorcet , who was on e of th e
first scholars to identify and exp lore the paradox. For a de tailed description of the
cyclin g problem , see infra Par t IL
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fu l by itself. Although unanimity does have this effect , it does
no t seem necessary in order to reinforce Delmvare's stature in
corporate law in the same way as t he I'vfarshall Court may have
needed unanimity to reinforce its sta tute in constitutiona l law.
1
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..~.n r'arts h t anu l
or. . t1,e
Article
, 1v cons1'd er .two a1terna
trve
t
•
exp lan ati o ns. 1n rart l ll , 1 exp,o re an mterest gr o up accoun.t
that suggests an important p urpose of unanimity may be to
benefit Del aware's coroorate b ar. A ft er concludimz t h a t this
,
.
. p>
1aus1'bl.e 'out mcom
.
•
.
explanation
JS
p11 ete m.
severa 1 Important
re ··
spects I consider, in Part IV, v.; hether unanimity reinforces a
moral d im ensio n of th e Delaware case law.12 Only by taki n g the
su nreme court 's role as moral arbiter of di rectorial b ehavior
into account is it possible to fully appreciate the role of unanimity on t he court. lVioreover, attending to the moral d imension of
the cases re duces some of the concerns about th e pervers e effects of unanimity. I argue in particu lar that , even when th e
court's doctrine is unstable, the outcome in the cases often is
more predictable.
As this brief overview suggests, I focus throughout the Article
on the role of unanimity in the development of corporate law.
As I hope wi ll be obvi ous, however , the analysis also is generalizable in many respects, and offers useful insights on broade r
questions as to the costs and benefits of unanimous and non unanimous judicial regirnes .
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I. T HE ROAD TO UNANIMITY: HOV/ DELAWARE GETS THE RE

Delaware's norm of unanimity differs markedly from t he de-cisionmaking p ractices of other high courts. Aside from occasional, high -pro file e xceptions and a brief attempt at unity dur ing the Marsh all Court era, the J ustices of the Supre me Cou rt ,
as noted above, have always issued multiple opini ons in a significant percentage of their cases. 13 State high courts have gen12 Ed Rock has provided the most systematic account of this underappreciated
m o ral role of Delaware d ecisionmaking. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners:
Th e Peculiar Mechanisms of D elaware Corpo ra te Law (Mar. 5 , 1996) (unpubli shed
manuscript, o n file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
13 My focus in thi s paper is on high court d ec isionmaking, but it is perhaps worth
noting th a t intermediate courts o f appeal a lso are characterized by a multiplicity of
opinions , th oug h to a lesser e xtent. Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 147. In addition ,
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erally been less di vided than the Supreme Court, perhaps in part
,,
., '
,.
h
l
1
'
oecause mey sp ena less or t ·e1r tlme res o _vmg p arucu wny contested issues. Yet rnost state high courts also issue a significant
n umber of separate o pinions. In California, to take a rel a tively
dramatic exa m pl·~, the hi gh court issued lTH.dtiple opi nions in
'h
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Del a>;vare 's justices write separately in only three percent of the
court' s reported cases . T h e percentage is even lo,Ner \Vhen con sidering th e co u rt 's whole docket. '5 T he minuscule nu.mber o f
separate opinions is particul arly noteworth y given that the supreme court, tmhke many state high courts , is the national arbiter of an impo rtant and often controversial area of law .' 6
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appe ll a te judges routinely issue separate opinions in the cases the y hear e n bane.
1
" These perce ntages a n: derived fr om a series of WESTLA W searches I condu cted
on the high courts of sev eral states. For detailed search parameters , see Appendi x A.
With respect to Caiifornia, I counted 69 nonunanimou s decision s-49 wi th at least
one dissent , and 20 with concurrences a lone-o ut of roughl y 106 reported decisions
in 1995 . (I defined reported decisions for the purposes of my searches to exclud e
ru lin gs on certiorari and pro forma decisions, even if they were included in a
re porter) . For Indiana, my se arch reve a le d 58 nonunanimous dec isions (42 with
disse nts, 16 wirh concurrences alo ne) out of 167 in 1995, or 34.7 %.
1; I give a more de tail ed break down in Ap pendix A , which anal yzes the output of
the supreme court from 1960 to 1996. A sta tistical analysis of thi s data done by J im
L ind gren using log istic regressio n in SPSS 7.5 made cl ear that th e De la ware supreme
co urt has mai ntaine d a cons istent commitment to uniformity ove r [he entire tim e
period 1 conside red . Pro fesso r Lindgre n used the year of the case as the predictor
variab le and whet he r there was a separa te opi nion as the respo nse varia ble. The
positive tre nd was so tiny (B==.008 1; R== .OOOO) that th e re was no mea ningful tren d in
the data. If these data had bee n a sample rather than the enti re popu lati on , the
results would not have been statisticall y significant. My thanks to Pro fessor Lindgre n
for the statistical help.
16
Of the 20 or so states 1 looked at, o nly Rhode Island (four in 1995) and New
Hamps hi re (fiv e in 1995 ) we re comparably stingy to De laware in issu ing separate
op ini ons. Beca use these sta tes, like De laware , are geograp hically small and have
sma ll (five-m e mber ) high co urts, on e might initially be tempted to con clude that
sma ilness of state and of court are the principal determinants of how freq ue ntly a
state high court is likely to issue separate opini ons. Yet a quick lo o k at comparab le
states immed iately complicates the picture .
T he high courts of geographically small stat es often are not coh es ive. F or instance,
the Conn ecticut h igh court was divided 44 times in 1995 , while th e New J ersey high
co urt was divided 29 times. Small co urt size can also be misle ading. T he Nort h
Dakora and So uth Dako ta high courts, both of which (like Delaware) have five
members , had 60 and 54 nonunan imous opin ions respe ctively in 1995 . A nd, as noted
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T wo fa cets of the Delaware judicial system serve as a starting
point for understanding the su preme court's ability to speak
with a unifi ed voice. T he first is Delaware's selection p rocess.
Many states popularly elect their high court judges. In Delav.;are , by contrast, the B ar Association plays a central rote in de . . wno
' WI·r·1 srt. on Lh e supreme court, mucn' as 1t. a,oes rn
.
termmmg
1
proposing changes to Delaware 's General Corporate L av1. i .A
nominating commission , one of whose members is appoin1:ed by
the Executive Committe e of the Delaware Bar Association,
does all of the initial screening, then submits a list of annrc-rri··
ate candidates to the governor. 13 Al though the governo; has\ :he
fina l say as to who serves on the court, he or she chooses from a
short list prepared by the commission. 19
earlier, Indiana 's fiv e -just ice high court had 58. See supra note 14. Eve n the
combination of a sm all state and a small court is far from foolproof a s an indica tor, as
evidence d by the fact that V ermont's five-member supre me cou rt issued 26
nonunanim o us decisions in 1995 . Thus , a lthough I discuss the significan ce of
D e laware 's small court further bel ow, see infra text accompan ying not es 22 -26, small
co urt a nd small state only begin to explain Delaware's unanimity norm. I suggest
seve ral addition a l factors, each of which plays a crucial rol e , in th e an a lysi s th at
foll ows.
17 In the legislative context, the corporation law section of the D el aware Bar
Association does nearly all o f the work in deve loping and drafting proposed
amendments to the corporation law . Although th e two ho uses of the D el a ware
G e nera l Assembly fo rm a lly enact th e amendments, the Ge nera l A ssemb ly has
tended (exce pt o n o ne or two hi gh- pro fil e occasions) simpl y to ru bberstam p th e
prop os a ls forwarded by the corporation la w section. For a use ful acco ur.t of
D e laware 's legislati ve process, see C urti s Alva, De laware and th e Mark et for
Co rporate Charters: H isto ry and Agency, 15 Del. J. Corp . L. 885, 903-16 (1990) ; see
also Dav id A. Drexl e r, The G rowth of C orporate Law, in The De la ware Bar in the
Twe nti e th Ce ntury 583, 594 (Helen L. Winslow, Anne E . Bookout & Pat ri cia C.
Hannigan eds ., 1994) (h e re in after T he De laware Bar) (noting an unwritten tradition ,
as o f the 1960s, that D e laware 's G en eral Assembly nev er consid ere d a proposed
corpora te law amendment unl ess the Bar Assoc ia tion had reco mm ended it ).
18 In addition to the Bar A ssociation representative , the commiss ion includes eight
members selected by the governor, four of whom must be me mbers of the D elaware
supreme court bar and four of whom cannot be me mbers of any b ar. See Del. Exec.
Order No.3, Mar. 29, 1993 § 1 (on file with th e Virginia Law Review Association) . T he
importance of the loca l ba r's ro le was underscored by a subsequent executive o rder th at
makes clear that th e commissi on can disclose confidential informati on to th e Bar
Associ ation 's Com mittee o n Judicia l Appo intments. See De l. Exec. O rd er No. 10, A ug.
20, 1993 § 1 (amending D el. E xec. O rd e r No. 3 § 6) (on fil e with the Virgi ni a Law
R ev ie w Association).
19 Th e commission is req uired to submit not less than three nom inees un less the
entire commission agrees to submit few e r. See Del. Exec. O rd er No .3 , sup ra note 18,
§ 7. The bar 's influ e nce was particularly striking when Justice An dre 'N Moore's 12-
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Judicial nominations do alternate between the two p ol itical

parties, 20 but as the discussion thus far suggests, the process is
large ly divorced from party politics in practice and is in that
sense apolitica L M oreover, the local bar-and th r·ough it the
nomin ating cornrnission--is acu tely aware of Delaware's tradi-tional orom inence in corvo:rate law , and of the value of ore,:,_
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likely to b e of li ke m ind on the general gosJs of corporate la-;,v
than are the me:r.nbers of other hi gh courts.
A second facto r contributing to the tendency towards unanimity is the size of the su preme court. Delaware 's supreme
court comprises only five justices , as compare d to the high
courts of many other states, which have seven or more members, and the nine -member Supreme Court.22 I t was cornprised
~

~,

.:.....J_,.r. ..._Y¥Cl ~ ·v

~

.1.

~ -

.-. -. ._

JL .JL .• -J,,..~

.ll..A. ...._

1.:. ...

L- .1.. ..,..

year term expired in 1994 . Rather than a list of multiple qu al ifi ed candidates, th e
nominating com mi ss ion ex cluded Moore and submitted exactly one na me to the
gove rnor-Vi ce Chancello r Carolyn Berger. See Richard B. Schmitt, Delaware
Governor Picks Trial Jud ge For Supreme Court, Wall St. J. , M ay 26, 1994, at B7 . l
discuss the bar's opposition to Justice Moore further infra note 91 and accompanying
text.
0
'
See De l. Ca nst. art. rv, § 3.
1
'
Of course, not a il of the supreme court's cases are corporate law cases. Roug hl y
one half o f th e court's cases are crimina l, a nd corporate cases co mpr is•..: a minority of
th e civil cases. See A dministra tive Office of the Courts, 1995 A nnual R eport fo r the
D e laware Judiciary 31 [hereinafter Delawa re An nual Re port] (207 d isp ositions in
criminal ap pe als and 249 in civil ap peals for fiscal year 1995). B ut the co rpor ate law
cases have a n obvious prominence due to the importance o f corporation-based
income to Delaware 's economy. Corporat ion cases also differ some wh at from case s
on crim in al and tort law iss ues due to Delaware's two- tier jud icia l system. Cases on
corporate and commercial law arc heard in the chancery court, a court of e quity .
Other cases are heard in Delaware's superior court in the first instance.
' 2 No sta te has fewer than five members on its highest court; six states hav e nin e
membe rs on the ir highest court, twenty-six states have seven , and e ighteen states
(including Delaware) have five.
V./ant 's Federa l-State Co urt Directory 125-77
(RobertS. Wanted. , 1994). Severa l corporate law commentators hav e pointed to th e
sm a il size of De laware's judiciary, which consists of the five chancery judges who
com prise the lower e quity court, toge ther with the five-member sup reme co urt , as an
important fa ctor in its decisionmak ing process in corporate la w cases.
Most
prom in ently, Ro berta Romano suggests that the small size of the judiciary in creases
th e certa inty of Del aware 's case law, a nd thus enhances De laware 's a ttractiven ess for
corporations. Roberta Ro mano, T he Genius o f American Corporate Law 40 ( 1993)
[h ere in after Ge niu s]; Roberta Romano, Law as a Pro duct: Som e Pieces of th e
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. & O rg. 225, 277 (1985).
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of three justices"' until 1978, when the court's bun::eoning
caseload forced it to expand to five justices."" A n d, in ~ sense~
th e expansion was o nl y partial ; the supreme court con tinues to
hear cases in thre e-justice panels, rather than (as m ost other
1 "
h
~
state mgn cou rts c1o)
en oanc. -:s rr'lh
1 us, t e supreme court tunctions in some respects as if it were even smaller than it i='T..... '1-IP imnl';c;;o.
tiox·l..: f o -,· ' 1 '1 ~I1 i n 1 i -'-Lv V" I.~ t1'1 "' " "l lDre l·,--, o ~n i-:r ·:-·' ." •:· .,.-,~_, -;oi .i
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sEe are ciear: 1 1avm g tev;er de c1s10nma cers rea uces tne nKeJ l 1-. . Wl,11 un d ermme
. .tw:::
· -, ::oun. s
uoou___] t h_at racuons am ong Lh e J, usttces
commitr.nent to speakin g with a unanimous voice . Yet s-::lection
proce s and sm all size almost certainly can not by the rnselves
ensure un animity. One can easily imagine that an inte rest in ju-dicial reputation or simply differing views on important issues
could cause one or more justices to write separately with some
regularity. 26 T hat a justice must be reappointed after twelve
years mitigates the desire to write separately, but the re appointment check is at most a limited one. 27
To more fully explain the court's success in consisten tly issuing un animous decisions , we n eed to consider a third fa ctor: th e
1
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:.1 Th e three-justice co urt was in st itute d in 1951. Prior to 1951, D ela wa re ha d no
p erman e nt supreme court justices. It employed a "leftover judge " syste m, pursuant
to which lower court judges who had no t been involved in a given case const itut ed
th e "suprem e court " for the purposes of resolving a n appeal. See Paul D olan , The
Supreme Cour t of De laware . 1900-1 952, 56 Dick . L. Rev. 166, 166 (1 95 2) .
:-1 Henry R. Horsey & William Duffy, The Supreme Court A fter i 951: Th e
Separate S up re me Court , in T he Delawa re Bar, supra note 17, a t 384, 384-85 (notin g
that as case filings tripled between the 1960s and 1970s, Chief Justice Herm a nn called
for an e xpanded court, which was e ve ntually provided by th e leg islature in
November, 1978).
25 En bane hearings are re q uired in certain circumstances.
See Del. Sup. C t. R.
4(d); Del. Sup. Ct. internal O p. P. YI!(l)-(7). I di scuss the particular requirem ents
in fra note 31 a nd accompa nyin g text.
: 6 Notice the contrast 'Nith a nonunanimity regim e . Under un animity , justices have
an ongoing incentive to write separately , and to free ride on th e other justices'
co llective committme nt to un a nimity. No nunanimity regimes a rc Iik e iy to be more
stable because they do not present similar opportunities for free riding.
7
:
See, e. g. , Del. E xec. O rd e r No. 3, supra note 18, at § 11 ("S itting judges who are
'Willing to be rea p pointed sha ll not be de nied recommendation by the Co mmi ssion
e xcept upon the affirmativ e vo te of at least two-third s of the membe rs. " ).
A noth er factor that se ems likely to enhance con sensu s, at least o n th e margin, is
that the Delaware supreme court does no t have certiorari powers, a nd thus d oes no t
select cases with an eye to developing th e case law.
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court's internal operating procedures. 28 U nder the courf s internal procedures, the justices ordinarily do not discuss cases u:n til
after oral argument. 29 Further, cases are assigned with an eye to
discouraging the devel opment of specialties. 30 Both practices
te nd to encourage the kind of consensus that is reflected in the
court 's ovinions .
'
T"
'
l e i.e
(:" ature orr tne
,
•
._he most re mancao
court , .; mterna1
procedures , hmvever , is that they impose a si gnific21.nt cost on dis senting from a panel opinion . Both the Supreme Court R ules
and the Internal Operating Procedures provid e for an automatic
en bane hearing in the eve nt of any pan el disagree ment.' 1 Thus,
a justice can write separately only if he or she is 'willing to force
a fu ll court he aring and continues to adhere to his or her original position . In consequ ence, a dissent is likely to emerge only
under extraordinary circumstances.
In short, almost every aspect of the evolution of D elaware su preme court decisionmaking-from the selection of justices, to
the court's small size, to its rules and intern al operating proce1

1

3
'
T he princip a l sources of the court's practices are the De laware S uprem e C ourt
Rules an d its Internal O perating Procedures. Until 1994, the Internal Operating
Proced ures were simpl y inform a l norms o f practice that th e court e mployed. The
proced ures were codified in 1994, after two ne w justi ces join e d the court. Telephone
Intervi e w with C hief Justice E. Norman Veasey (J une 1996) [here in a fter Veas ey
Int erv ie w].
9
'
De l. Sup. C t. Intern a l O p. P. IX( l ) . It is inte re st ing to note th a t jurors in bo th
civi l an d cr imin a l trials opera te under simil ar stri ct ures aga inst disc uss in g a case
outsid e of th e fo rmal decisionm ak ing process . As with the sup re me co urt, it see ms
likely th at one effec t of the practice is to e nco urage co nsen sus.
0
'
De l. Sup. C t. Intern a l Op. P. V I(2). G iven th at the ch ief j ustice has ultimate
respon sibility for ov ersee ing the panel assignment process, see id. V 1(1 ), the effect of
the policy again st speciali zation obv iously de pends on how the chief justice wi e lds his
o r her a uth ority.
" De l. Sup. C t. R. 4(d); Del. Sup. Ct. In te rn a l Op . P . V II (cases un able to garner a
unanimous opini o n mov e automatically to en ban e co nsiderat ion) . T he rationale for
requiring that divided op inions b e heard e n ban e is that a split op inion does not
retl ect the vo tes of a majority of the fiv e -me mber co urt. Veasey Int e rvi ew, s upra
note 28 . Ot her cases th a t presen t ground s for an e n bane hea ring incl ude cases that
will poss ibly overturn a Delaware precedent, capital cases, a nd cases that two justices
vote to hear en bane. Del. Sup. Ct. Intern a l Op . P. VII.
Interesting ly, the supreme court does no t tell th e pa rties o r ot herw ise ma ke clear
the reaso n why it is reh ea ring a case en bane. Veasey Interview, supra note 28. This
suggests that if the full court la te r issu es a unanimous op inion , a s it often does,
o bse rve rs ma y no t know whe th er it was th e prospect of disagreeme nt o r of ove rruling
prior prece dent tha t precipitated th e full co urt 's revi ew .
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du res-reinforces the court's tendency to speak with a single
vmce.

II.

TJ:t-.JANIMITY AND D OCTRINAL C YCLING

Identifying the te ndency toward unan imity, an d the fact ors
reinforcing it, raise s a cruci al qu estion: \Vhat d ifference d oes
unani mity m ake, as comp ared to an alternative regime ? lhe
o bvious ans-...ve r is that unanimity may stab ilize the case law,
since it eliminates the possibility that fra gment ation vvill cast
doubt on the court's reasoning in a given are a.
Yet unanimity can have almost precise ly the opposite effect.
T he suggestion that unanimity may undermin e the cl ari ty of a
court's decisions is not new, 32 but previous commentators h ave
tended simpiy to note this without exploring it in an y sys tem atic
way. My goal in the analysis that follows is to use the insights of
social choice theory to provide a much more detailed assess ment of the effects of unanimity. 33
Because I am primarily concerned with unanimity in D elaware corporate law cases, I focus on D elaware's takeove r cases 34
and use an illustration based loosely on these cases to demonstrate (among other things) how unanimity may magnify the risk
o f doctrinal cycling. In addition to showing the effects of un ani mity, my analysis helps to explain an enduring irony of Delaware cor porate law: the fact that , while stability is oft en recited
as one of the re asons for D elaware 's success in attracting corporations, D elaware 's doctrine in several crucial are as appears, at

See, e .g. , Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the C ourt, 95 Harv. L. Re v.
802 , 810 & n.23 (1982) (suggestin g that th e contin e ntal trad iti o n of unanimity is
characte ri ze d by sho rt, platitude-filled opinions that prov ide littl e guid a nce).
33
For useful analyses of other corporate law issues in soci a l choice terms, se e
William J . Carn e y, Does Defining Co nstitu e ncies Matt e r? , 59 Ci n. L. R e v. 385 , 42022 (1990) (detailing perve rse effe cts of " other constitu e ncy "' statutes ); J e ffrey N.
G ordon, Shareh o ld er Initi a tive: A Soci a l Ch o ice and G ame Th e oretic A pproach to
C orporate Law, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347 (1991) (suggesting that cycling concerns may
justify abso lute de le gation rule that preve nts share holders fro m initi a ting mos t
corporate decisions) ; se e a lso David A. Skee l, Jr. , Some Corpo rate a nd Securities
Law Perspectives on Student-Athl e tes and the NCAA, 1995 Wi s. L. R e v. 669, 679-82
(re viewing social choice e ffects of stud e nt-athl e te represe ntation in N CAA
decisionmaking).
).1
Ev e ry one of th e hostil e takeover cases I discuss was unanim o us.
32
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least on initial inspection, to be remarkably unstab1e.

35

A . Social Choice and Delaware Takeover Law
In order to set the stage for the social choice analysis that
fo Eov;s, I begin by briefly describing the doctrinal devdoprn ents
t hat vnlr serve as tne bas1s tor our exp10rat10n m: tn e u.•:J anEl.·nty
no rm. In the mid-1980s, the dramatic increase in tak eovers gave
rise to a series of cases that posed a particularly cE:f:ficult d ilemma for Delaware judges. In the face of a hosti le bi d , or 2
contest between fr iendly and hostile bidd ers, the d in:.cto:cs of a
target corporation often too k measu res to prevent the hostile
bi dder from acquiring control. For instance , target company
managers adopted or refused to remove " poison pill" devices 36
that were designed to make acquisition prohibitively expensive ,
or added supermaj ority vo ting requirements.
Bidd ers re-spond ed by alleging that these efforts violated target directors'
fiduciary duty to their shareholders.
The dilemma for the Delaware supreme court was that target
directors ' actions in the takeover context did not fi t neatly
within either of the traditional categories used in addressing fi duciary duty issues. 37 Target managers have an obvious conflict
.,
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Professors Macey and M ill e r ha ve suggeste d a n inte rest gro u p e xplanation fo r
t he occasi o na l e le me nts of un ce rtaint y in Delawa re law. Jonathan R . Macey &
Geoffrey P. lVliller, Towa rd an Interes t-Gro up Th eory o f D elaware C orporate Law,
65 Tex. L Rev. 469, 498-509 (1 987) (suggesting th at Delawar e law is u ncertain
e no ugh to a ll ow interest groups s uch as th e corporat e bar to o btain re nts, b u t not so
uncerta in as to give co rpora ti o ns an incentive to incorporate elsewh e re) . Bu t they do
no t address the significance of the supreme court 's tendency toward unan im ity. For a
mo re d e tail ed co nsid e ration of interest group issues , see infra Part Iif.
6
·'
Poi son pills take a vari e ty of forms, mos t of which in vo lve a prom ise by the
target corporat io n to give stock or other securiti es to th e firm 's sha re hold ers, or se ll
the m at a barga in price, in the eve nt of an acquisition of a spec ifi e d p o rtion of th e
target's stock. See Randall S. T homas, Judici a l Review o f Defensive Tactics in Pro xy
Co ntests: W he n is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 Vand. L Rev. 503 , 510-11 (1993) .
37
Oversimp li fy ing somewhat, directorial duties fa ll in to two gen eral ca tegories: the
duty of ca re a nd the duty of loya lty. The duty o f care is , as t he name suggests, a n
o blig a tion that directors e xercise appropriat e care in ma kin g d ecisions fo r the firm.
The b usiness judgment rule acts as a presumption in most cas e s that a dire ctor has in
fac t satisfi ed thi s o bliga ti o n. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis , 473 A.2 d 805, 812 (De l.
1984) (defining business judgme nt rule presumpti o n ). The duty of loyalty , which
co mpri ses a var iety o f relate d o bligations , applies if th e d irector has a conflict o f
int ere st, as whe n she e nt ers into a transaction with th e corporation . For a good
introdu cti o n to directori a l duties, se e Robert C. C lark , Co rpo ra te Law 123-89 (1986) .
'5
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of interest in the takeover context, because they frequently will
be replaced in the event of a takeover. Thus, the tradition al
deference that the d u ty of care and business judgment ru le provide for d irectors vv'ho do n o t have a conflict of interest did not
seem in o rder. Yet the cases also were n o t classic du ty o f loyalty
cases ., vih ich are subj ect to aggressive revie\v, because the d irectors' conflict of interest , though very :rec:d; ~;v as rnuch less direct
than iD a traditiona l duty of loyalty case .
Dela\var;':'s response was to attempt to articula te an interme diate stan dard of review in the ta keover cases . The sunreme
court has suggested in a series of decisions spanning the last
decade that it will apply scrutiny that is greater than in most
contexts , but not so searching as in true duty of loyalty cases. 38
For the purposes of our analysis of unanimity, assume th at
9
D elaware has three justices/ that the takeover cases have just
arisen , and the justices' positions on the issue are as fo llows.
Hypoth e tical Justice Alde n believes that tar get managers fa ce a
severe conflict of interest and should therefore be su bject to significantly enhanced scrutiny. That is, these cases are much more
l

s In the two most pro minent ea rl y cases, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Pe trole u m Co., 493
A. 2d 946 (De l. 1985) a nd Revl o n, In c. v. Mac A ndrews & Forbes H oldin gs. 506 A.2d
173 (Dei. 1986) . the court held th at th e direct ors' use of d e fens ive measures must be a
reasonably proportiona te response to a reasonab le be li e f th at a hosti le bid
constitu tes a threat, Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 , and that if it beco mes clear that th e
target is '·in play,'' the directors must foc us so le ly on obtain in g the best pr ice for
shareho lders. Rev/on, 506 A .2d a t 184 n.16. These cases ca ll for an int erme diate
leve l of scr utiny, and thu s correspond roughly to the "E nh anced Scrutiny " standard I
describe below .
Th e co urt has subseque ntl y engaged in several striking s hifts. Most prom in ently ,
the court ap peared to e mph asize director di scretio n in Paramount Commun ica tions
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (De l. 1989) [her ein afte r Time- Wamer for short form case
citati ons], only to shift o nce again to a n approach loose ly anaiogous to the posit ion I
describe below as "Share holder Prerogative," in Para mount Comm unicati ons v. QVC
Network, 637 A.2d 34 (De l. 1993). I discuss the se s hifts, and the possibi li ty that they
may amount to cycling, further infra note 75. The o th e r important cases in this
doctrinal lin e are U nitrin, Inc. v. A me ri ca n Gen. Corp., 65 1 A.2d 1361 (De l. 1995),
Mi ll s Acqu isition Co . v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (De l. 1988), a nd Ivan hoe
Part ners v. Ne wm on t Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
'" As noted earlie r , see supra tex t acco mp an ying no te s 23-25, De lawa re's supreme
court hears cases in three-justice panels, but the e ntire court hears th e case in so me
circumstances . I ass um e three justices in order to simp li fy t he exposition , b ut t he
a nalys is that fo llows will hold tru e any time the j ust ices hol d three or more posit ions,
no one pos ition is held by a majority, and any coalition comp rising the justices
holding two of the three pos iti o ns wo uld garner a majority.
3
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like duty of loyalty than duty of care cases and the court should
therefore conduct a substantive review of every transaction the
directors either approved or stymied. I will refer to this approach as "Enhanced Scrutiny."
H ypothetical Justice Baker, by contrast, thin ks a better approach is to focus on the shareholders of the target. In order to
ensure that shareholders rather than directors ultimately retain
control over the decision whether to accept a takeover bid,
given the directors' conflict of interest in this context, Baker
would forbid the directors from using defensive measures
against a hostile bid except in two circumstances: (1) to facilitate
an active auction;~ or (2) if the shareholders would retain effective control of the corporation even after the directors thwarted
a hostile bid and facilitated a merger with another, favored bidder.41 Otherwise, the directors would not be permitted to interfere wi th any tender offer or otherwise wrest control of the
takeover decision from the shareholders. 42 I will refer to this
view as "Shareholder Prerogative."
Finally, hypothetical Justice Clark believes that target directors should be given substantial discretion, both because D elaware has long emphasized directors' authority to manage the
corporation, 43 and because th e directors do not face a true confli ct of interest in the takeover context. This position I will call
"Director D iscretion. "
0

The rationale for permitting the directors to exercise contro l for the limited
purpose of conducting an a uction is that an auction will generally increas e the
takeover premium that shareholders receive, and shareholders are not wellposition ed to conduct the auction themselves.
1
"
Baker 's second exception assumes there is less cause for concern if the
shareholders retain ultimate control, and thus can reverse any transaction of which
they disapprove. See, e.g., QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (emphasizing the fact that the target
shareholders would not retain control after the proposed transaction).
·~ Baker's view is thus a variation of Easterbrook and Fischel 's " passivity thesis,"
which contends that directors should be prohibited from defending against a hostile
bid in any way. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fi sche l, The Proper Rol e of a
Target's Management in Res po nding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv . L. Rev. 1161
(1981). Unlike the passivity thesis, Baker's position would allow the directors to use
defensive measures , but only in the narrow circumstances describ ed in the text.
"' See, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice , 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) ("The bedrock of the
Ge neral Corporation Law of Delaware is the rule that the business and a ffa irs of a
corporation are manage d by a nd under the direction of its board.").
"0
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Continuing the example, assume further that if the court did
not select E nhanced Scrutiny, Alden would prefer that the justices choose Shareholder Prerogative rather than Director Discretion , due to her strong opinion that managers cannot be
truste d with the takeover decision. Baker's second choice, after
Shareholder Prerogative, v.;ould be Director Discretion, because
she beli eves that courts are not well situa ted to engage in a sub··
. rev1e\v
.
..
1'
AJh
h .
stant1ve
or corporate d
ec1s1onmaKmg.
.<'l. "L ougn s. e 1s
sk eptical of managers' motives, she would rather have thern
making the decisi on than a court, if the Shareholder Prerogative
approach is to be rejected. As for Clark, based on her view that
directors rathe r than shareholders should be the principal deci··
sionmakers, she woul d opt for Enhanced Scrutiny as her second
choice after Director Discretion.
The justices' rankings of the three approaches would therefore look like this:""
~

1

2
3

ALDEN
Enhanced Scrutiny
Shareholder
Prerogative
Director Discretion

1

BAKER
Shareholder
Prerogative
Director Discretion

CLARK
Director Discretion

Enhanced Scrutiny

Shareholder
Prerogative

Enhanced Scrutiny

The problem here is th at the justices' preferences" 5 are unstable. If the justices were to hold a series of pairwise votes among
"" As the description in the text suggests, my analysis focuses on the justices'
varying doctrinal approaches-that is, their views on alternative legal "rules."
Professor Kornhauser has argued that courts should and do focus solely on the
"results" of previous cases for stare decisis purposes, rather than on the legal rule
that is applied in a given context. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts I:
Path-Dependence, 12 l nt'I Rev. L. & Econ. 169, 173-77 (1992) [hereinafter, Collegial
Courts I]; Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II: Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 441, 443-44 (1992). Because this contention seems notably inaccurate
as a description of Delaware supreme court decisionmaking, given the important
(though somewhat misleading, as we will see in Part IV) role that doctrinal rules play
in the Delaware cases, I put it to one side. For a similar criticism of Kornhauser's
characterization of the nature of stare decisis, see Bruce Chapman, The Rational and
the Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and Adjudication, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 41, 47
n.ll (1994).
5
"
In using the term "preference" here and elsewhere in the analysis, I do not mean
to suggest that the justices base their decisions on their personal perspectives, rather
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the preferred approaches, Enhanced Scrutiny would prevail
over Shareholder Prerogative, an d Shareholder P rero gat ive
woul d defeat Director Discretion, but D irector Discretion
would the n prevail against Enhanced Scrutiny .J6 Thus, the justices not only lack a clear first pl ace ch oice among the ap--.,
·=---::hut
: l. -nreferenc
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, consisten t, because Enhanced Scrutiny loses to a pos1tlon
(D irector Discretion) th at v;ould itself le;se to a p osition
(Sharehol de r Prerogative) that Enhance d Scrutiny d efeats .
Stated di ffe rently, no matter which approad1. t he justices select,
there will ahvays be an alternative approach that a majority of
prefers
Lt..t a~·
L ·c· ··ally
11 •
.._
t lLi., vp ·..-n
It is this dilemma--the inability to m ake a stable choice
among three or more options-that social choice theorists refer
to as ('cycling;' or the " Condorcet P aradox. 7 Kenneth Arrow
generalized the insight with his famous theorem demons trating
that it is impossible to guarantee that a collective decisio nmaking process will both satisfy a short list of fairness req uirements,4~ and maintain rationality, which Arrow defined as the
1

.t

•

".j

than at te m pti ng to make objective judgments. See Lewis A . Ko rnhauser & Lawrence
G . Sager, U npac king the Court, 96 Yale L.J. 82 (1986) (d istin guis hing jud gm en t a nd
prefe re nce -based a djudicati o n, and arguing th a t adjudication tends to be judg m e ntbased). Rather, in keeping with co nv e ntion in the socia l choice literature, I use the
te rm sole ly to distinguish th e justice s' differing views on th e fi d uc ia ry duty issue. Se e ,
e .g., Gordon, supra no te 33, at 362 n.35 (noting a nd ad opting thi s usage) .
6
"
T hi s is because A lden and C lark prefer Enhan ced Scrutin y to Share holder
Prerogat ive; A ld e n an d Baker prefer Shareholder Pre rogative to Directo r D iscre tion;
a nd Baker and Clark pr e fer Director Discretion to E nh ance d Scrutin y.
" Game theorists use sti!! another label, defining the p ro b lem as d ecis io nmakin g
vvith an "e mpty co re ." See , e .g. , Varouj A. A ivazia n & J effrey L Ca ll en, T he Coase
Theo rem and th e Empty Co re , 24 J.L. & Eco n. 175 (1981). It is im porta nt to
e mp hasize that a cyclin g problem only aris es if th e justices' vi e ws include at least
three pe rspectives th a t ca nn ot be a rrange d on a singl e -peake d curve-that is, if the
justices ' views are mult ipea ked . For use ful discussio ns o f the se re q uiremen ts, see
D ennis C. Mueller, P ublic C hoice II, at 81, 393 (1989) ; William H . R iker, Li b e rali sm
A ga in st Populism: A Co nfrontatio n Between the Theory of D emocracy and the
Theo ry of Social Choice 123-28 (Waveland Press 1988) (1982) . !f the j ustices had
differing views of just two approaches, or if th ey had similar views a bout the
decisionmaking framewo rk , their preferences would not cycl e. O n the other han d,
unanimity can cause somewhat relate d problems ev en in the a bs ence of cycling. I
d iscuss this, and the que stion whether supreme court justices are lik ely to h ave multipeaked preferences, infra Section II.B .
.1iJ Kenneth J. A rrow, Socia l Choice and Individu al Va lu es ( i 95 1).
T he most
impo rt ant of the "fairne ss " re quirements for the a nalysis that follows are ''range" a nd
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ability to aggregate the preference rankings of three or more
•
• •
,.
1... •
49
voters m a trans1t1ve rasuw n .
i'dthough the existence of cvclical rJreferences
might othert
wise pose serious problems for supreme court decisionmaking,
th e iudici al orocess counteracts this risk in several imoortant
'-N ?,ys . Fi rst , in those contexts 'Nhere the justice ~; do h ave cyclical
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"independence of irre leva nt alternatives. " The range postulate requires th a t no
possible individual preference ord e ring be off-limits. Independence requires that
each decisio nmaker adhere to her actual ordinal ranking of th e alternatives, rathe r
than, for instance, altering her ch o ice with an eye to a subsequent vote for st rategic
reasons. The remaining requirements include unive rsality , whic h re quires that no
collecti ve prefe rence ordering be precluded; unanimity , or the Pareto postulate,
which requires that the process honor any preference that eve ry individu a l would
agree to; and nondictatorship, which proh ibits any individual 's preferences from
trumping those of other individuals. Different commentators have tended to co mp ile
the list , which subseq ue nt writers have distilled from Arrow 's original a nal ys is ,
slightly differently. Max well Stearns gives useful summaries of the postulates in each
of the articl es cited infra note 50, based on terms first developed in William V ick rey ,
Utiiity, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules, 74 QJ. Econ. 507 (1960). See also
Mue]lt;r, supra note 47, at 385 (foilowing Vickrey's restatem e nt in compilin g list);
Riker, supra note 47, a t 116-19 (compiling list without reference to Vickrey).
J" Transitivity requires that if X de feats Y, andY defeats Z, X must also de fe at Z .
See Mue ll er, supra note 47, at 385. The problem face d by co ll ec tiv e decisionmaking
bodies, and illustrated by the cycl e described in this Ar ticle, is that eve n if each vote r
can rank her owi~ preferences transitively, it may not be pos sibl e to aggregate the
individual vo ters' views to produce a transitive outcome.
50 See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, The k iisgu ided Renaissance o f Social Cho ice. 103
Yaie L ..J. 1219 (1994) (arguing that th e ob ligation to reach an outcome distinguishes
courts from legislatures and forces the adopti on of rules that do not reveal cyclical
preferences) [herein after M isgui ded Renaissance]; ~~!axwell L. Ste arns, Standing
Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social C hoice, 83 Cal. L. Rev . 1309 (1995)
(sam e ) (he reinafter Standing Back]; Max well L. S tearns, Standing and Soci a l C ho ice:
Historical E vidence, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 309 (1995) (same) [h ere inafter Historical
Evidence]. The effect of case-by-case decisionm ak in g is to limit appe llate courts to
one of two principal choices in most cases-to affirm or rev erse. Because there are
onl y two options, cycling cannot occur within the case at hand, al though the effect
may be to mas k cyclical preferences across the underlying issu es .
One of the costs of the case-by-case approach is that it may allow, and ev e n cause,
inconsiste nt treatm e nt of the issu es that underli e the result In view of this , se veral
comm e ntators have argued that courts should abandon case-by-case voting, at !east
in some cases . See, e.g., Lewis A. Korn hauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The O ne an d
the lv!any: Adjudication in Collegial Cour ts, 81 Ca i. L. Rev_ 1, 30-33, 57 (1993)
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Second, stare decisis reduces the likelih ood of cycling through
tirne. Because it establishes at least a presumption against reconsiderin g a rule or outcome that was rejected in a previous
case , stare decisis reduces the likelihood of intertemporal cycling.'i This second context, the possi bility of intertempor al cyclLg, is 'v'i here th e unanimity norm may actuall y have a destabili z ing rather than a stabilizing effect on doctrinal develo pmen t
as compared to a less unified approach. In order to appreciate
th is , con sider ho w our hypothetical justices might address a specific dispute unde r the unanimity norm, as compared to a regime -where th ey more fre quently issued separate opinions .
Ass ume that T arget has recently signe d a pre limin ary me rger
agreeme nt with Friendly Corp. pursuan t to which Target shareh olders will receive stock of F rie ndly currently worth $50/share
in return for their sh ares of Target. No single share holder holds
more than 1% of Target's stock, but Manager , the chief executive officer of Friendly, holds 70% of Friendly's stock and wou ld
hold 40 % of the combined company. Shortl y afte r th e prelimi[h e rei n afte r T he O n e a nd T h e M any] (a d voca ting " metavo te" as to wh e th e r to
e mpl oy case -b y-case or issu e-by-issue vo ting). H owe ve r, no t o nl y wo ul d su ch
app ro aches e nt a il a signi fica nt ch a nge fro m curre nt pract ice , b u t th ey al so wo uld
introd uce probl e ms tha t co ul d p rove m o re tro ubl esom e tha n th e o nes th ey a dd re ss .
Se e , e .g., Ma xwe ll L. S tea rn s, H ow O utco m e Vo tin g Pro mo tes Prin cipled Issue
Id e ntifi cati on : A R ep ly to Pro fesso r Jo hn R ogers a nd Ot he rs, 49 V a nd. L. Rev . 1045
(1 996 ).
; 1 F or ins ta nce, in th e exampl e we ha ve b e e n co ns ide rin g, if a p ri o r case h ad
e stabl ishe d E nh a nced Scru tin y as the pro p e r a p pro ach o ve r Share ho ld e r P re roga ti ve ,
sta re decisis wou ld li mit t he justi ce s' ability to re vis it S ha rehol d e r P reroga ti ve in a
subsequ e nt case . In Arrovi a n terms, sta re d ec isi s lim its th e " ra nge " of a va il a bl e
d ecisions (becau se it e liminates a n o ption ) , and in doing so prev e nts the justice s fr o m
e ngagin g in e no ugh p airwi se vo te s to re vea l a cycl e . It th us se rves m uc h t he sa m e
fu nctio n as a p rohi b iti o n aga in st recon siderin g rejected mo ti o ns in th e leg is la ti ve
co n text. See Stea rn s, Standing B ack, s upra no te 50, at 1356-5 7; S te a rn s, Hi s to ri ca l
E vide nce , sup ra no te 50, at 3 19 & n.38.
T h e cos t of th e sta b ilit y pro vid e d b y sta re d eci sis is t ha t it crea tes p ath d e p e nd e n ce
a n d th e possib ility of pa th ma nipul atio n. In th e exa m p le just give n, fo r in stance , if a
subse q ue nt case p itt ed E nh a nced Scrutin y aga ins t D irecto r D iscr e ti o n , D ire ctor
D iscret ion (whi c h Ba ker a nd C la rk p re fe r to E nh a nce d Scru tin y) wo uld e m e rge as
th e rul e, e ve n thoug h o th e r sequ e nces o f ca se s wo ul d le ad to E nh a n ce d Scrutiny o r
Sha re ho lde r Pre rogat ive . Yet sta nding a nd re la te d justiciab ili ty requirements reduce
t he threa t of pat h ma ni p ul a ti on . Se e, e.g ., Ste a rns, H istorica l Ev idence , supra not e
50, a t 335-37. B ut see E aste rb roo k, supra no te 32 , a t 820 (arguin g th at sta re d e ci sis
sho u ld be reiaxe d or a bando ned in con stitu tio nal law case s in o rd e r to red uce pa th
d e p e nd e nce ).
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nary merger becomes public, Hostile Bidder launches a te nder
52
offe r promising to pay $70/share for all of Target's stock . T arget 's directors use defensive m easures to thwart the tender offe r , contending bo th that Target and Hostile Bi 1der ".AJould be a
poor fit and that H ostile B idder 's offer is highly uncertain. Hos·i
l n;
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Under these circumstances, A lden -vvould atgue t ~ ::: t ·~l arget' s
directors sh ould be su bject to E n hanced Scru tiny, an d woul d
almost certainly conclude that the dire ctors breache d the ir du ti e s by refus ing eve n to consider the higher bid . Und~r Baker's
pre ferred approach , Shareholder Prerogative, the case is somewh at closer, sin ce Target 's shareh olders the oretically could o ust
th e directors of the com bined company after the rnerger or en tertain a future takeover bid . B ecause M anager vvill hold 40%
of the stock, however , shareholders' voting power would be
m o re theoretical than real after a merger, so Baker too might
conclude th at Target's directors should h ave co ns idered Hos tile
Bidder's offer. 54 In contrast to A lden and Baker, Clar k would
apply a Director Discretion approach, and might well be inclined to uphold the directors' actions absent extraordinary fa ctors calling their judgment into qu estion.
Al though the justices would h old that the Target d irectors
breached their fiducia r y duties un der both no nu mmi:mity and
unanimity regimes, th e opinions reflecting this conclusion would
T he illu stratio n is th us somet hing of a hybrid between Pa ramo unt
Com municat ion s v. T im e, Inc., 571 A .2d 11 40 (De l. 1989), where no shareho lde r o f
the fr iend ly bid de r (Warne r) '.vo uld have a signi fica nt stake in the comb in e d
compa ny, a nd Param ou nt Com m unica tions v. QVC Ne twork, 637 A .2d 34 (D e l.
1993), where the chi ef executiv e officer of the fr ie ndly bidd er (Viaco m) was to hold
nearly 70% of the combined company's stock. See QVC f'letwo rk Y. Paramo unt
C ommun icati o ns, 635 A.2d 1245, 1247, 125 1 (Del. Ch. 1993).
53 In most of t he takeover cases, bo th the host il e bidd er and a group of non bi dde r
shar eho lders have fi led su its see king to e njoin the targe t directors . The De law are
courts genera lly !lave conso lid ate d the cases an d add ressed them togethe r. See, e.g.,
QVC, 637 A .2d a t 36; Time -Warner , 571 A .2d at 1142.
S.J ln U ni trin, Inc. v. Ame rican Gen. Corp., 65 1 A .2d 1361 (De!. 1995) , one o f
De laware's most recen t takeove r cases, th e supreme co urt's deci sion takes the fo rm er
a pproach-and em phasizes the (somew hat debatabie) poss ibility that a group of
man ager-shareh olde rs that ha d practica l control co uld be unseate d in a proxy
con tes t. ld. at 1382-83.
52
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differ dramatically. In a nonunanimity regime, t h eir decision
·,;voul d almost certain ly entail two separate opinions, and perhaps even th ree . Thus, Baker might join an opinion by Alden
holding that the directors breached their duties , or perhaps
'..v:rite separately to emphasize h er view that the coun sh o uld ap~L
.
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h :::tnd, might \Vrite a dissenting oDinion insistin 0P that the co urt
:;ho uld e mpl o y Director Discre ti on in takeov er cases, an d that
rr
·
d10
• n o t oreacn tne 1r d.ut1es.
·
:t arge t ' s.d1rectors
Unde r a una nimity norm , by contr ast , thF:: justices would need
't o reconcile all three different perspectives in a single o p inion .
l n vi e vv of this, wh at we might expect to see is a single opinion
th at a ttempts to bring all three positions to bear. T hus , A lden
might draft an opinion emphasizing the need for Enh a nced
Scrutiny in the takeover context, yet also suggesting that Share hol d er Prerogative is a crucial factor and t hat th e analysis is
wholly consistent with Deiaware 's traditional commitment to
Director Discretion. 56
As a quick look at almost any of Delawa re 's recent takeover
decisions shows, this is precisely the form many of the supreme
.........
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;s Baker's decision >vhether to join th e Alden op ini o n pres umably wou!d depend
o n A lde n's willingn ess to recogni ze Share ho lder Prerogative as a consid e rat ion in th e
a na ly sis. Thus, Bak e r might adopt En ha nced Scrut iny as the co ur t's a p proac h, but
sugge st th a t courts should consider the effect o n sha reho lders as a factor bear in g on
the fairne ss iss ue .
Notice that Enhanced Scrutiny wou!d become the prevailing rule if Baker joined
A.ld e n 's opinion. If Baker only concurred in the judgme nt, on th e other h a nd , th e
case wo uld not establish a clear approach , since none of th e options would garner tw o
votes. See ge nerall y Kornhau se r & Sager, The One and the Many, s upra note 50 , at
8 n.14 (distinguishing betwe en "true " concurrences that reject the majority 's
ration a le but concur in the judgment and "two ce nts" concurrence s that jo in th e
maj ority but add the justice's own thou g hts on th e case). M o re over, even if Ba ker
join ed th e opinion , her Share holder Pre rogative view could influence subse quent
case law to the extent it was seen as a useful way of und e rsta nd ing the maj o rity
o pinion. See Ken Kimura, No te , A Le gitim acy Mode l fo r the Interpre ta tion of
Plural ity Decisio ns, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1593 (1992) (suggesting precedential auth o rity
of pl ura li ty opinions should vary with type ); Igor Kirman , Note, Standing Apart to be
a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Co ncurring Opinions , 95 Co lum. L.
Rev. 2083 (1995) (suggesting a two-p a rt inquiry for determining when a concurre nce
shou ld be deem ed to have precedential value).
56
See ge nerally Kirman, s upra note 55 , at 2099 (Suprem e Co urt justice s will add to ,
o r " deliberately cloud," their analysis to o bt a in nece ss ary votes).
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57

court's decisions take . In a very real sense , the decisions sugges t not a choice among approaches, bu t of all of th em. In
striking contrast to a non u nanimou s regi m.e, the u n an imity
no rm encou rages the justices to ado p t a combi n ed a pp roach
that is acceptable to all three , rather than articulating their differing views o n the appropriate doct ri nal s pproach. 5'
1 t ~ C' )-"n
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risk of cycling in a unanimity regi me. J. he effect can take eith er
o f t wo form s. First, the unanimity nonn may cre a te the possi-·
bil ity of a doctrinal cycle th at would simply not occur if the justices issued se p ar ate opinions. In the exam ple we have just con sid ere d , a jo int o pinion by Alden an d B ake r th at e m ph asized
Enh anced Scrutiny and Shareh older Prerog ati ve, and that rejected D irector D iscretion, would, under o rdinary principles of
stare decisis , limit the court's ability to shift to Director Discretio n in a subsequent takeover case. To the extent this held true,
it would preven t the co urt's takeover doctrine from cycling over
a series of cases in a nonunanimity regime. The single opinion
issued in a unanimity regime, on the other h and, wou ld do
noth ing to prevent doctrinal cycling. Because the combined ini tial decision would not rule o ut any of the three a pproaches , the
-'-

! ;:'>
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57 ln QVC, for inst a nce, the court states that " [i]n the sale of comrol contex t, the
dire c tors must foc us on one primary objective-to secu re th e transaction offe ring the
b t~ S t va lu e re asonab ly av ailabl e fo r the stock holders, " QVC, 637 A.2d <1 t 44, an
.En h arJCed Scru ti ny sta ndard. T he court then artic ul a tes the directors' obligat ions in a
fash ion that emph asize s directo r discretion: "[A ] court should not ignore th e
complexity of th e directors' task .... Th e board of d irectors is the corp orate
deci sionmaking bod y best equippe d to make these judgrnents." ld . at 45. It also
s uggests tha t th e shareholders' loss of voting powe r is a key factor by emp hasizing
"the threate ned di minution of th e current stockholders' vo ting power " and "the
traditional concern of Delaware courts for actions which impair or imped e
stock holde r votin g rights ." Id.
" Unani mity could also be see n as encouraging the ju stices to "cardinalize" th e ir
p re fere nces-that is, to take inte nsity of prefere nce into acco unt-a nd , for justices
vv ho di sagree, to accede to th e wis hes of the oth e r justices unl es s they feel par ticul ar ly
strong ly ab out th e ir views. T hi s p erspective is consistent with severa l justices'
su gges ti o n to me that the Del awa re process is des igned to prod uce unani m ity unless a
justice fee ls especiall y strongly abo ut his or her di sagre em e nt . For further discuss io n,
see infra note 80.
Fa ilure to take in te nsity of prefe re nce into accoun t is a freq uent cri ti cis m of
Arrow 's theorem a nd the subsequent social cho ice li terature . See , e.g., R ichard H .
Fil des & .Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
The o ry , Value Plura lism , and Democratic Politics, 90 Co lum. L. Re v. 21 21 (1990).
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court could continue to shift arnong them in subsequen t cases.
Doctrinal cycling could, an d does, occur in nonunanimity regimes, of course, and this might '·Nell be the case in the hypo. 60 ~J
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Ject m a. seconct v.;ay. Jl ne 1ssEance m a smgle opm10n app ea mg
to all three appro aches ten ds to disguise the possibility of a cyc!ing problem , and thus provide3 significantly less information
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as to tne st atus oi taKeover uoctnne . ~- 11e ISsuance of separate opinions, or even a series of close votes on
the merits of particular cases, signals th at the doctrine in q ues rion may be unstable. 61 By contrast, a unanimous opinion is
m uch less likely to provide a useful signal, and can o bscure the
possibility that the co urt m ay d ram atically shift directions m a
subsequent case. 62
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;-> Korn hauser co nte nd s tha t diffe ri ng views as to doctrinal rule can not le ad to a
cycle in th e absence o f stare decisis. Ko rnh a user, Collegial Co urts I, su pr a note 44, a t
178 (criticizing E aste rb roo k , supra note 32) . T hi s a rgument see m s to ignore th e
possi bilit y th at nondoctrina l factors-here , th e just ices' vi e ws on the a p propriat e
outcom e in each given case, as seen through the lens of thei r pre fe rre d doctrinal
approach-ca n have an e ffect on doctrina l development. As sugge st e d by the
hypo th et ical in the text, the se factors cl e arly can produce a tru e m ajority cycle.
'" M ost obvio usly, sta re decisis acts only as a presum pt ion of adh e rence to an
esta blished app roac h, and it will on ly cou nteract cycl in g to the ex ten t it is in fact
applied . Moreover, if Baker concurred onl y in the judgmen t, the stare d ecisis effect
of A ld e n's opi ni o n would be limi te d, because the op ini ons would pr ese rve one vot e
for eac h of the three positions. Cycli ng-like effects d ue to shifts in th e j ustices' views
over time, d isc ussed infra at no tes 67- 69 a nd acco mpany in g te xt, are d istinct from
th ose due to concurre nces . Fo r a debate abou t th e me ri ts of stare dec isi s, compare
Lew is A Ko rnh a user, A n Econom ic Perspective on Sta re Decisis, 65 Chi.-K e nt L.
Rev. 63 (1 989) (a rguing that stare decisis is d ifficult to justify from an e conomi c
perspecti ve ) with Jon ath an R. Macey, T he Internal an d E xte rnal C osts and Benefits
of Stare Decis is, 65 C hi .-Ken t L. R ev. 93 (1989) (arguing th at stare de cisis b e nefits
both li tigants and judges " by al tering the na ture of liti ga nts' de man ds fo r judicial
services" ).
61
Commentators ha ve m ade simil ar points in assess in g U .S. S upreme C o urt
decis ionmaking. See, e.g., Easterbrook , su pra Do te 32, at 810, 817 (multipl e opinions
prov id e additi on al inform a tion) ; Ri chard L. Revesz & Pame la S . Ka rlan,
No nm ajority Rules a nd the S upreme Court, 136 U. Pa . L. Rev. 1067, 1105-06 (1988)
(n ot in g that re peated 5-4 sp li ts in the Supre me Court in d icate an ex ist ing prece dent
ma y be un sta bl e); Ko lsk y, s upra no te 2, at 2085 -86 ("K now ing th e nu mber o f Ju stices
who di ss ent from an op ini o n and how they disagre e wili inform peo ple 's views ab out
th e le giti macy and force of th e opin ion. " ).
62 Not ice that this is a prob lem in unanimit y regi mes wheneve r th e justices hold
di verging views, ev en if the ir prefe rences do not actu a lly cycl e .
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The Supreme Court's decisionmaking under the secunt1es
laws-the one corporate law context wh ere it, rather than the
Delaware supreme court, is the leading source of ju dicial review- offers a striking illustration of the information al diffe rence between unanim ity and nonunan i:mity regimes. \Nhereas
shifts in the Delaware supreme court ha ve often come as a surprise , d ue at least in part to the effects of the u, ~an i m i ty no rm ,6 '
the tend ency of U.S . Supreme Court Justices to write separately
provides a much more pronounced warning that the existing
doctrine is unstable . In the insider trading context, for ex am ple,
the Justices' internecine dispu tes have m ade clear to even casu ai
observers that the current ap proach-wn ich predicates liability
on the existence of a duty of the defendant to a corporation
whose stock the defenda n t purchases or sells based on inside information- could be displaced by the broader misappropriation
theory .64 The justices do not eliminate the instability by signal' ' In add ition to the takeover cases we ha ve been consid eri ng, ano ther muchd isc ussed ex ample o f such doctrinal shiftin g ca me in the context of s ubsidiary or
'· freezeo ut " mergers, pursuant to which a pa re nt co rporat ion merges a subs id iary int o
itse lf and e limin a tes minority shareh ol ders. In Singer v. M agn avox Co., 380 A .2d 969
(De l. 1977), the supre me co urt shifte d from its tradi tiona l scr u tin y to a m uch stricter
approach, req uirin g that th e parent show th e re was a "b usiness purpose" for effect in g
the free zeo ut. The co urt a lmost immediately re treated fro m this standard in Ta nzer
v. International Ge n. Indu s. , 37 9 A. 2d 1121 (D e l. 1977). It has subsequ ently
abandoned it s e mphasis o n busin ess purpose, and has focused on ;vhe th er a n
effec ti ve in depe nde nt specia l co mmi ttee negotiated on beha lf of the subs idiary. See
Kahn v. Ly nch Co mmuni cat io n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2 d 701 (D el. 1983); se e a lso Frank H . Easterb roo k & Daniel R. Fischel,
The Eco no mic Structure of Corp orate Law 134-36 (1991) (disc uss ing these doctrinal
shi fts).
" Chi are lla v. U ni te d States, 445 U .S. 222 (1980), interpret ed the principa l in sider
trad in g prohib iti o ns,§ 10(b) o f th e Securities Ex ch ange Act of 1934 (codifie d at 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)) a nd SEC R ule l Ob -5 thereunder (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1 0b-5 (1996)), as requiri ng th e governm e nt to prove the defend ant was under a
duty to a corp oratio n whose stock the defend an t boug h t or sold. C h ief Justice
B urger arg ued in disse nt that th e gove rnm ent need o nl y show that the defend a nt
mi sappropriated information, that is, purloined it from someone. Chiarella, 445 U.S .
a t 240 (Burger, C.J., disse nting). Ju stice Blackmun arg ued for a sti ll broad er view,
under which any trade r who had in sid e info rmatio n cou ld be held lia ble, regardl ess of
whet he r she acquired the inform a ti o n in a n ina ppropr iate fash ion. ld. at 245 -46
Justice Powell's major ity opm10n left the
(B lackmun, J. , dissenting).
misappropriation theory ope n beca use it had not been rais ed below. Id. at 236 . The
Co urt la ter di vid ed 4-4 in a case th a t squ are ly presented the misappropriatio n issue.
See Carpe nte r v. U nited States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
T he pate nt in stab ility in th e S upre me Court 's insi der tradi ng jurisprudence has not
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ling its existence through separate opinio ns, although they do
. to t 1h e extent t "hey a•dh·ere to stare aec1s1s.
' . . 65 -:._l~onet
T
l1ere d uce rt
less, th e opinions forewar n future p r.:u ties, and enab le them to
adjust their b ehavior accordingly. 06
T hus fa r, I have assumed th at the justices ' preferen ces r emain
stable through time . 1Che unanim.ity n orm can prod.uce add itional instability if the justices' preferences chan g ~~ o ve r ti me .
Suppose, for instance, tha t three o f Dela"Y.Jare)s justices initially
vievved Enhanced Scrutiny as the best appro8.ch , one preferred
. .id er lD rerogat1ve,
.
D"1rector ~.
. .67 A l o~h,areno.
anc.1 one 1C
l)J,scretwn
though .t:nhanced Scrutiny commands a clear m ajority, the
court's opinion might also incor porate Shareh older Prerogative
and D irecto r Discretion into the an alysis in order to maintain
unanimity. Because th e o pinion preserves all three perspectives, eve n a change of heart by one of the Enhanced Scrutin y
justices when the next case com es al o ng, or a change in the
composition of the court in the i~t e rim, could introduce the possibility of a su bsequent cycle-like shift among the approaches .68
been lost o n litigants. The SEC co ntinues to argu e mi sapp ro priation , and th e circuit
co urts are now split. The Second, Seve nth, Ninth, a nd (a rgu ably) Third C ircuits
acce pt th e mi sappro pri ati on the o ry. See United State s v. Newman , 664 F.2d 12 (2d
Ci r. 198 1), ccrt. denied , 464 U.S. 863 (1 983) ; SE C v. C herif, 933 F .2d 403 (7th Cir.
1991), cert. denied , 502 U. S. 1071 (1992); SE C v. C lark , 915 F.2d 439 (9th C ir. 1990);
Rothberg v. R osenbloom, 771 F.2d 81 8 (3d C ir. 1985), cert. de ni ed , 481 U. S. 1017
(1 987 ). T he Fourth and Eighth Circuits rejc r:t misapp ro pria ti on . U nite d States v.
Bryan , 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995); U nited States v. Cn-Iaga n, 92 F.3d 61 2 (8th C ir.
1996), ccrt. granted, 11 7 S. C t. 759 (1997) .
Th e S uprem e Court has rece ntly granted certio rari in O'Hagan , and thus p ro mises
to address the misappropriati on t heory directly this te rm.
o; This is refl ected in the C ou rt's continued failure, aft er nearly two deca des , to
adopt a se ttled a pproach to Rule lOb-5.
"" See, e.g., R evesz & Karlan , supra no te 61, at 1106 (suggest ing that ev id e nce of
doctrinal instab ility diminish es a party 's incent ive to rely o n the existing approac h
a nd e ncourages litigants to challenge the approach) .
7
"
Recall th at th e supreme court ordin ar ily hears cases in thr ee ju stice pan e ls. A s
discussed ear iier, if o ne justice indicat ed a n inte nti o n to disse nt a t the pan e l leve l, the
prospect of a dissent would automatically trigger an e n bane hearing. See infra notes
23-25, 31 a nd accompanying text.
"' In social cho ice term s, the justices n eed no t engage in " principl e d voting''-that
is, because they are not o n r ecord (in an o pinion ) as sup porting a particular
approach, they a re much less cons train e d by th e ir origin a l ordinal ranking than would
o therwise be the ce>.se. O n the role of opinions in pr o moting principled voting, see
S tearn s, Standing Back, supra note 50, at 1349-50.
Notice that, with cases decid e d by three-justice panels, even changes in panel
compos iti o n could lead to doctrin a l shi fts.
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rv1oreover, the court would h ave no need to announce that such
a shift h ad occurred , because the in iti al opinion left open the
69
option of moving to a different approach.

B . How Often 'vVill Cycling Occur?
·:f,....., . · .
~e last "'Pct : "' ..""~ A-i... ,.+
)'""~;.,.....-.~ \'- y ~,...p.--· -~~-n,.· . . . (. . , . -'r,Cclu.VlD
t; cHg~ 1·ed
~t ~
1·n~ t !1
0<.:~ d l_; il Llidl ULdHLi.llll• .l vg!,\ .e:::; cct.[ e
s;,gnifican tl y more prone to cycling than nonunanimous ones, \Vc
novJ m ust add ress a closely re lated iss ue : How fre quently v;ill
'
.rl
1 actually
-- occur.? 70
cyc1es 01c tne
sort ;,ve h~ave consiuerec.
1
.
r1
.
'
J ere are severa 1m port ar~ t curos on uoct nnal cycnng m
Delav1are corpo r ate law. Most importantly, several of the fac to rs that make unanimity possible-the court's small size an d
the tendency to select justices with a similar perspective on corporate law 71 -greatly reduce the likelihood that the justices will
have multipe aked preferences. Delaware justices can be expected to be sympathetic to publicly held corporations and their
managers, for instance, rather than having the wide range of
perspectives one sees on the Supreme Court and many other
collegial courts. 72 T o the extent the justices ' perspectives are
single-peaked as a result, cycling ·will simply not occur. 73
Even if the justices have relatively simil ar views as to the ge n eral go als of corporate law, however, th eir preferences may
neverth eless prove to be multipeaked.H Particularly vvith con r-..
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,.; i. t is interesting to note in this regard that none of t he take ov er cases we have
be en discussing were he ard en bane. This suggests that th e just ices did not view any
of the case s as reco nsidering existing law , see De i. Sup. Ct. Intern al Op. P. VII(2)
(req ui ring e n ba ne hearing of case that co uld mod ify o r overrule es tab lis hed case
law), desp ite th e s hifts in th e cases, as deta il ed infra no te 75 , a fact th at is arg ua bl y
attribu tab le to the malle ability of th e opinions.
70 T hi s question is a frequent a nd importa nt o ne in the soc ia l choice literat ure. For
rev ie ws of the literat ure consid e rin g the fact o rs tha t magni fy o r reduce th e likeliho od
of cyclin g, see Mue ll er, supra no te 47, at 81-82; R ik er, s upra note 47, at 123 -28.
71
See supra no tes 17-25 and accompan yin g tex t.
72 For an argume nt that the Supre me Cour t has become incre asingly multipeak ed
in its preferences in recent d ecades, and th at it has used th e doctrine o f sta nding to
counteract the risk of strategi c manipulation by ideol og ica l litigants, see Stearn s,
H isto ri cal Evidence, su pra note 50, a t 349-85.
73 Rike r, supra note 47, at 124.
" Fo r a simil ar point about the ri sk of cycli ng a mon g sha re ho ld ers we re they given
th e a uth ority to initi a te corpo ra te decisions o n th e ir own , see Gordo n , supra note 33 .
Go rdon argues t ha t e ven if all of a firm's sh are ho lders were int e rested principally in
wea ith maximiza ti o n, the y couid eas il y ha ve mul tipeak ed prefere nce s on the issue of
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troversial issues, and given that court composition or justices'
perspectives may shift over time, the multipe akedness necessary
to p recipitate a cycle or cycle -like effect can easily arise.
T he takeover cases reviewed in Section II. A are an excellent
example. Even if the justices shared a similc.r view of the gen eral ro le of directors in cor porate lavv , the d ifficul ty o f assimilating the takeover cases into Delaware's existing fi duciary duty
fr amework could easily lead to th e kin ds of multipe aked views
th at can produce doctrinal cycling. In fact , although we considered the cases in hypothetical form, they come quite close to
embodying an unackn owledged cycle .75
Moreover, in a sense , it does not matter ·whether or not
De laware corporate law has in fact cycl ed in any given are a.76
An incomplete cycle, or a doctrinal shift in a contex t where the
how bes t to achiev e th at go al. Id . at 359-85. In te rest in gly, thi s po int may be e ven
stro nge r with re spect to the justices of the supreme co urt, since th e ir views on
co rpo ra te law a re unlik e ly to di still to a single perspec ti ve li ke wea lth m ax imi za tion .
On the oth e r ha nd , th e ju sti ces obvi o usl y co mprise a dra ma ti ca lly sm a ll e r gro up ,
whi ch wo ul d te nd to reduce the lik e lih oo d of mul t ipe ake d preferen ces.
7S To see thi s, we need o nl y focus on th e in itial takeover cases, U n oca l C orp. v.
Mesa Pe troleu m, 493 A.2d 946 (D el. 1985) , a nd R e vl o n, Inc. v. M acA nd rews &
Fo rbes Ho ldin gs, 506 A.2d 173 (De l. 1986), an d the two most pro mi ne nt late r cases,
Para mo un t Co m munica ti o ns v. T ime , Inc., 571 A. 2d 1140 (De l. 1989), a n d Par a mo unt
C om m un icatio ns v. QVC Ne twork, 637 A.2d 34 (De l. 1993) . Revlon an d Uno cal
a nn o unced the E nh ance d Scr utin y sta nd ard, but a lso can be read as ack nowledg ing
the importance of Share holder Pre roga ti ve and D ire ct o r Discre ti on. Rev/on , 506
A .2d at 180-81; Un oca l, 493 A .2d at 954-56 . The first two cases thu s rese mbl e
Alden's prefe re nces (ES/SP/D D ).
In Time -Warner the supre me co urt shi fte d dramatica ll y, and em ph asi ze d D irec to r
D iscr e tio n. Tirne-W arner, 571 A .2d at 1153 . It al so m a de ge stures tow ard E nh a nced
Scrut in y a nd Sha re hold e r Prerogative . Id . a t 1150, 1~154 .
Time-Warner thu s
res e mbles C lar k's preferences (D D/ES/SP) .
F in a lly , the cou rt sh ifted to a much greater foc us o n Share holder Prerogative in
QVC- e mphasizi ng the fact tha t th e proposed tra nsfer o f the target wou ld e limin a te
the share ho lders' voting auth ority within the firm . Q VC, 637 A.2 d a t 42.-45. QV C
there fore loo ks some what like Baker's preference profil e (SP/DD/ES).
T h us, the fo ur key takeover cases ca n be seen as e mbo d ying so m e thing li ke th e
cycle we con si dered in th e last Secti o n. I hesi tate to ma ke thi s claim too stron gly ,
because one could q ui bb le with seve ra l aspects o f this characte rizat ion. A lth o ug h th e
supreme co urt repea te dl y hig hli ghted the effect o f the propose d merger on
share hold ers in QVC, se e, e.g., su pra note 57 (quo ti ng statements fro m th e o pinion
emp has izin g sha re holde rs ' p light ), it is n o t clear that the case ca n be sa id to have
adopted Sharehold er Pre roga ti ve (o r a variation on this pe rspect ive) as its prin cipa l
approach. W ha t is cl ear, howe ver, is tha t th e cases come qu ite clos e to a cycle und e r
a ny characterization, and thus und erscore the poss ib ili ty tha t a cycle co ul d occur.
76
See supra note 62 and accompany ing text.
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justices' preferences are actually unipeaked rather than mul tipe aked, can produce the same kinds of doctrinal opaqueness as
might be caused by a true cycle. 77 In short, unanimity appears to
contribute in important respects to doctrin al instability, both by
exacerbating the risk of cycles and by otherwise clouding the
development of corporate lavv doctrine .
'vV e have focused througho ut this Part, a.nd v.;ili continue to do
so hereafter, on the effect that unanimit y has on doctrinal de·velopment through time- that is, we ha ve focus ed on 3equ ences
of cases, r ather than on a single case. Neverth eless, it is important to note th at just as un animity can increase doctrinal instability when the justices ' preferences are un ipeaked as well as
when they are multipeaked, unanimity also may alte r the justic~ s' decisionmaking process within any given case.
This becomes immediately clear if we briefly consider the
median voter theorem. The median voter theorem predicts that
if decisionmakers' preferences are unipeaked, the outcome in a
maj ority voting regime will gravitate toward the preferences of
the median voter, since this individual 's vote is necessary to secure a majority. 78 Under unanimity, by contrast, the need to
bring even outlying voters within the fo ld suggests th at the median voter's perspective will not control. As a rough approximation , we might predict that unanimous voting will gravitate toward the mean of the justices' views. 79
" See Go rdon , supra note 33, at 363 (simil a r point in the co ntext of shareh o lder
in itiation ).
7" See Mue ll e r, supra no te 47, at 64-66 (d escribin g m e di an voter theorem in bot h
intuitive a nd qu a ntitativ e te rms). For an app licati on to bankruptcy , see Dav id A.
Skeel, Jr ., T he Nature and Effect of Co rporat e Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization
Cases, 78 Va. L. Rev. 461 ,480 n.69 (1992) (chapter 11 vo ting rul es focu s intluen ce o n
residu al o wner, which is a nal ogo us in some respec ts to t he medi a n voter).
7" I am grateful to Saul Levmore fo r suggest ing this point to me in con vers atio n.
P e r haps th e best way to appreciate thi s di stincti o n b etwee n un a nimou s a nd
no nun an imous reg imes is thro ugh an illustrat io n ba sed o n o ur takeove r hypot he ti ca l.
Ass um e that, rat he r than including three different app roach es , th e justices ' views
e ntail o nl y two: E nhance d Scrutiny a nd Director Discretion. (Although I usc two
ap proaches for s implicity, th e analysis co uld ho ld tru e e ven with three approaches , so
long as th e approaches could be arrayed o n a sin g le-pe a k ed curve . Sin glepe akedn ess is d escribed in detail and shown graphically in Riker, supra note 47, at
124-28; see also Sau l Levmore, Parli a mentary Law , Major ity Decisi o nm a kin g, a nd
the Voting Paradox , 75 Ya . L. Rev. 971 , 987 & n.47 (1989) (de scribin g sin g lepeakedness)). But th e justices a re nevert he less divid ed as to th e appropri a te
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Interestingly, however, the unanimity norm could have an
even more dramatic effect on the justices' vievvs in some cases.
If the outlying justice feel s particul arly strongly, and the o ther
justices are wedded to preserving unanimity, the would-be ma-·
jority justices might mo ve cl ose r to, or even adopt, the outlyin g
justice's perspective. State d in soci al ch oice terms, th e D elawa re supreme court's d isinclinati on to issue separate opin ions is
likely to enhance the justices' ten dency to take the intensity of

approac h, with A lden preferring a n aggress ive vers ion o f Enhanced Scrutiny , Baker
prefe rrin g Enh a nced Scrutin y, but not so aggressive ly ap plied , a nd C la rk p r eferr ing
D irector Discretion. Ass um e th a t the just ice s' persp ectives ca n be port rayed in
simplifi ed form o n th e bar grap h t h at foll ows, wit h Alden 's view re prese nted by Po int
A, Ba ker's by Point B , and Clark's by Point C:
En han ced Scrutiny

_ __ I__________ I_
A

B

Di rector Discretion

C

Co nsid e r first how things would pl a y out und e r a regim e th a t allowe d for se parate
op ini ons. Beca use Baker's vote is n ecessa r y to ob tain a majority , th e m edian voter
th eore m sugges ts th a t the o utcome wi ll re fl ect he r view , which is re presented b y
Po int B . Und e r a un a nimity norm, by con trast, Baker's vi ew would not by itse lf
co ntrol , since A ld e n a nd Baker wou ld ne e d to sec ure C la rk 's a pproval o f th e opin ion
in t he case ; thus , they no longe r h ave th e luxury of simply ign oring Cl a rk' s vie w. In
co nseq ue nce, we would exp ect th e justices to m ov e to a positi o n somewh e re to the
right of Point B, in order to sec ure Cla rk 's vo te a nd a un a nim o us o pini o n. A lth o ugh
it is un clea r how far to the right A ld e n and Bake r will be requi re d to mov e, it se ems
lik ely th a t th e e ventual point will be somewh at closer to Point B t han to Po int C,
s in ce a s hift to th e right of B requir es b o th A ld en a nd Bake r to alter their pos iti o ns.
One p oss ibility , as note d in the text , is that the o utcom e in a unanimity regime may
retlect the mea n of the justices' views, rather th a n th e m e dian view as in a majority
voting regime.
In th eo ry at least, if two of the justices are no t strongly committed to a particul ar
o utcome, the distinctio n b e twee n unanimi ty a nd nonun a nimit y regim es could affect
not only the justices' doctrinal pos ition , but eve n the outcome in so m e cases.
Gra phi ca ll y, we can illu strat e this poss ibility with a vari at ion o n the chart used abov e :
E nhance d Scrutiny

l __ l_ __ lll _ ___ _ l_
A
B
0
c

Director Discretion

Ass um e t hat 0 represents th e poin t whe re the o utcom e in th e case sh ifts , such tha t
poi nts to the left of 0 e ntai l liabili ty , a nd po ints to the ri ght of 0 do no t. If u na nimit y
wo uid lea d the justices to ad opt a positi o n to the ri ght of 0 , it could a lter the
o utcome as compare d to a nonun a nimi ty regim e. As suggested abo ve, such a shift
cou ld on ly occur if Alden an d Baker were not irrevoca bly co mmitted to findi ng
li ab ility in th e case. In th e tex t that foll ows I suggest a noth er scen a rio where one
jus tice's view co uld tip the ot he r two.

155

Unanimity Norm

any particular judge's preference into account m the decision·k·-mg process. 80
mak
Unanimity thus has a significant effect on the nature of judicial reviev;, both in any given case and across a court's case law.
1v1ost dram atically , unanimity can increase doctrinal instability.
R ecognizing this leads us to yet anoth e r cruci al q uestion: Why
has Delaware supreme court decisionmaking not only evolved
toward unani mity, but also retained this attribute, despite its
apparently problematic implications?
I attem pt to sort this out in the Parts that follovv, and in doing
so suggest that the doctrinal instability encouraged by unanimity
is not quite so p roblematic as it first appears . 'vVe will see by the
time we complete Part IV that the outcomes in the cases are less
unpredictable than the supreme court's doctrinal pronouncements.

III.

WHAT LA WYERS HAVE To Do WITH
GROUP EXPLANATION

IT: AN INTEREST

Given the historical uses of unanimity, the most obvious explanation for D elaware's unanimity norm might be judicial
credibility. Just as Chief Justice Marshall fostered unanimity to
enhance the standing of the early Supreme Court,s Delaware's
unanimity norm could perhaps be explained as a m e ans for the
court to solidify its standing as the nation's leading arbiter of
corporate law issues. This might be part of the explanation, but
as a full account, it is unsatisfying in many respects . It does not
explain, for instance, why Delaware's supreme court, unlike the
1

so To the extent this is true, the justices would in effect be cardinalizing their
preferences, and thus relaxing their adherence to the "independence of irrelevant
alternatives" postulate. Sec supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing
Arrow's postulate). My suspicion is that something like this, which is analogous to
logrolling in some respects, takes place to a certain extent in most collegial courts,
and that unanimity magnifies the effect, given the added holdup power such a regime
gives to an outlying judge. But even in a unanimity regime, it seems likely to come
into play only on the margin. See generally Stearns, Misguided Renaissance, supra
note 50, at 1225-26 n.18 (criticizing suggestion by Lynn Stout that judges can and
should engage in logrolling). It is interesting to note that the Delaware supreme
court's practice of prohibiting discussion among the justices about a case until
immediately after oral argument, see Del. Sup. Ct. Internal Op. P. IX(l), reduces
even the appearance of vote trading of the sort that takes place in legislatures.
81
See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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U.S. Supreme Court, has retained its unanimity norm even after
having fully established its preeminence in corporate law.
lVIy goal in the remainder of this Article is to provide a more
nuanced explanation of the unanimity norm. I begin, in this
Part, by considering wh at the interest group branch of public
choice theory might h ave to say about the significance of unanimity.82 Because the interest group perspective ultimately
proves incomplete, I add a ·;ery different perspective in the following Part, one which vvill return us to a variation on the issue
of judicial credibility.
For our purposes, the central insight of interest group theory
is that concentrated interest groups often can secure favorable
legislation at the expense of more diffuse groups, due to diffuse
groups' relative inability to organize effectively even when they
have a great deal at stake. 8' As the heading of this Part suggests,
our eventual focus will be on the role of the Delaware bar (as
well as on the justices themselves). T o appreciate the relationship between the bar and unanimity, however, we must first
consider the interest group dynamic in corporate law more generally.
The interest group that appears to have most clout in the corporate law context is corporate managers, due to the fact that
they usually choose the firm's state of incorporation. 84 Although

A brief word on terminology at the o utse t. Many writers , particularly in the
lega l literature, treat the terms ''public choice " and " int eres t group theory" as
synonymous, and as distinct from, though re lated to , "social choice. " I use " public
choice " in its broader se nse, as a n umbrella term e nco mpass in g a va riet y of specific
perspectives such as interest group the ory and social choice. This accords with the
fact that each of the sp ecific perspe ctives offers insights into the nature of " public" o r
multi-party decisionmaking. For a de tail ed di sc ussion of the se definitional issues and
of public choice generally, see David A. Skee l, Jr. , Public C hoice and the Future of
Public Choice-Influenced Lega l Scholarship , 49 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming Apr.
1997) (reviewing Maxwell L. Stea rn s, Pu blic C hoice and Public Law: Readings and
Commentary (1997)).
83 Classic articles in the dev e lopment of interes t group theory include Gary S.
Becker, A Theory of Competition Amo ng Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98
Q.J. Econ. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,
19 J.L. & Econ. 211 (1976); and G eo rge J. Stigl er, The T he ory of Economic
Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971). Macey and Miller were the first to
apply a sophisticated interest group analys is to corporate law . Macey & Miller, supra
note 35.
"' For similar reasons, th e co rpo ra te lawyers who advise a firm al so a re key pl ayers
"2
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commentators continue to dispute whether states generally, and
D e laware in particul ar, are effective regulators of corporate
law, 85 nearly everyone agrees that Delm:vare, and other states interested in kee ping or attracting corporations, res pond to managers when legisl ating on corporate l ir·.N .
For Del aware , the spoils of victory a re the signific ant di rect
and indirect payments a firm makes for th e privilege of being
86
incorporated in Delaware. L ike the effort to attract co rporations, the decision h ow to di vide th e benefits of charter competitio n success may also be affecte d by inte rest group competition. 87 This is where D elaware's lawyers come into the p icture .
One of the indirect benefits of Delaware's charte r competition
in the incorporation decision. Macey /l<.. M iller. supra note 35, at 486. Although th e
managers' and lawyers ' choice ordinarily is subj ect to shareholder approval, the
choice is almost always approved. Commentators differ as to whether this reflects
collective action problems in share holder decisionmaking , or a perception by the
shareholders that the choice is in their best interests. Co mpare Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L Rev. 1549, 1575-76 (1989)
(describing ways managers take advantage of shareholders' collective action
problem) with Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case
for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1599, 1606-13 (1989) (questioning
severity of the collective action problem).
~ 5 The charter competition debate stems, in its recent incarnation, from William
Cary's contention that states' efforts to lure corporat io ns into the state produce a
" race-for-the-bottom, " see William L. Cary , Fede ra li sm and Corpora te Law:
Retlect ion s Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J . 663 (1974), and Ra lph Winter's response
that market forces imp el states to enact gene1ally efficient laws. See Ralph K
Winter, Jr., State Law, Sharehold er Protection. and the T heory of the Corporation, 6
J. Lega l Stud. 251 (1977). For a review of the de bate, and an application of simil ar
insights to corporate bankruptcy regulation, see Da vid A . Skee l, Jr. , Rethinking the
Line Be tween Corp orate Law and Corpora te Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471 (1994).
86 The most obvious direct payment is the franc hi se taxes corporations pay to
Delaware. Roberta Romano has persuasivel y argued that Delaware's dependence o n
these ta xes, which represent more than 15 % of De laware's tax revenues, see
Romano, Genius, supra note 22, at 6-8 (co mpilin g data fro m 1960-1990), effective ly
holds D elaware hostage, id. at 38-39, committing it to continued se nsitivity to the
interes ts of co rporations.
87
In the interest group literature, the distinction between the interest groups that
compete for legislation, and those that provide it, is often characterized in demandsupply terms. The groups that compete for legislation comprise the "demand" side.
Those who provide the legislation and/or participate in the rents obtained from
demand-side interest groups , such as Delaware's legislature and the Delaware bar,
co mpri se the "suppl y" sid e. See Macey & Mill e r, supra note 35, at 471 (describing
Delaware corporate law in these te rm s); Freel S. McChes ney, Rent Extraction and
Inte rest-Group O rganiza tion in a C oasean Mode l of Reg ulation , 20 J. Legal Stud . 73
(1991).
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success 1s legal work for its corporate bar. Delaware's b ar
clearly is an extraordinarily po werful group, an d many o bservers beiieve that the bar parlays its in±l uence into legal rules that
maximize fi rm s' use of Delaware lawye r s . ~'
No tice that the an alysis thus far suggests only that Delaware's
legislative process may ben efit both out-of--state corporate man agers and (more im portantl y for our purposes) Delaware la\vyers. The unanimit y norm, on the other hand, is a ch aracteristic
of D elaware's judici al pror.:-ess , and it is not immediately de ar
whether the interests of the Delaware bar are also like ly to influen ce the state's supreme court.
Although judges obviously are more isolated from interest
group influences than legislators, De laware 's justices are likely
to refl ect the interests of t he corporate bar. The most obvious
source of sympathy is the judicial selection process. As described earli er, the Delaware bar plays a central role in selecting
justices, and it can be expected to recommend individuals who
have a natural affinity to the corporate bar. 89 This n atural inclination is amply borne out by even a cursory look at who is ordinarily selected to sit on the supreme court. Ne arly all of the justices, both currently and as a historical matter, were members of
the Delaware bar before donning judicial robes. 90
A much-reported recent incident involving the selection
process reinforces the point that Delaware's justices h ave reason
to be sympathetic to the interests of local lawyers. D elaware 's
justices are typically reappoi nted as a matter of course. However , when Justice Andrew Moore 's twelve-ye ar term cam e to
an end in early 1994, the nomination committee declined to
submit his name to the governor as an acceptable choice. It was

ss See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 35, at 506-09; Lany E. Ribste in, D el aware ,
Lawye rs, and Co ntractual C hoice of Law, 19 D el. J. Co rp. L. 999, 1009-10 (1994)_ An
obvi ous constraint on franchis e ta xes a nd o n in d ire ct taxes such as rules maximizing
firms ' use of De laware lawye rs is, as Macey and Miller po int o ut , that De laware 's
prim acy in corporate law re quires th a t th e total costs of Delaware in corporation not
become so great as to encourage firm s to look elsewhe re. See Macey & Iv!ille r, supra
note 35, at 505.
so See supra notes 17-19 a nd acco mpan ying te xt.
9D See Macey & Mil ler, supra not e 35 , at 502 ("The members of th e Delaware
Sup re me Court are drawn predominantl y from firm s th at represent corporations
registered in Delaware.").

Ut7a,nz·r,'1 i t\J
.,

' J.,

•

..,. ..- ~

..1

159

iVov,'
• """'
r ,'

1 ,

widely believed th at th e refus al to renominate IVIoore h ad li ttle
to do with the qu ality of his d ecisionmaking-- which was , and is,
seen as highly competent- and eve rything to d o with his frequ ent belittling of the lawyers who appeare d befo re him .91
Assmnin g that Delaware 's j udici al process mi ght tend to
h
•
ben ent t1h e L}e! awa re b ar , tne next quest10n 1s wneL,er
unammity itse lf has th is effect. F rom at l~::asL one perspective, it clearl y
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trin ai uncert ainty, manifes ted rn.ost dr?trr1atically in th e possibilitv of cycling . Uncert ainty ten rJ s to benefit lawvers b y increasin g
tl·~e am ount of litigation (more li tigation mea~s mo~e work fo.r
lawyers );y 3 and by increas ing the need to retai n lawyers fo r advisory purposes , eve n in the absence of litigation .94
Y et even if th e un ani m ity n orm enhances the value of lawyers' services, t his does not by its elf assure that u nanimity wi ll
b enefit D elaware's lawye rs. In order for the supreme court 's
decisionmaking process to fav or the local bar, the litigation not
only m ust be fil ed in Delaware :rather tha n elsewhere , but o utof-state shareholder (o r corporate) plaintiffs an d out-of-state di rector defe ndants 95 must rely to an appreciab le extent on D elar•
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91
See, e .g ., R ic ha rd B . Schmitt, De laware Governor P icks T ri a l J ud ge fo r S u pre me
Co urt, Wa ll St. J., May 26, 1994, at B7 (not ing a llegations th a t th e la w firm of
Skadde n , Arps , Sla te, M eag h er & Flo m influe nced the o utco m e, a n d sta t ing th at " th e
m a in case again st [Justi ce Moore] appea red to be t hat he was so metim es ve rba ll y
ab usive to lawyers and in se nsit ive to their nee ds in sched ulin g hea rings.").
1t is important no t to o ve rge nc ra lize frOITJ t he Moore ex p e ri e nce, howev er. l do
not mea n to suggest, for in sta nce, t hat D ela ware's just ices co nsciously take th e bar's
int e res ts in to account. R a th e r, t he pr incip a l point is that the se lection p rocess wi ll
ge nera11 y le ad to j ustices w ho a lready tend to sh a re t he ba r's perspect ive. Ne il
Ko m esar m a ke s a simi lar point , which he refers to as th e "irre le van ce of mo tiv e ,"
with respect to the legisla ti ve process. See Neil K. Ko mcsar, Impe rfect A lt e rn a ti ves:
C hoosi ng Institutions in Law, Eco nomics, and P ubl ic Po licy 58-65 (1994 ) .
9
' T h is is no t to sa y th at the interest g roup anal;,s is persuasive ly describes why th e
unanim ity norm h as d e ve lope d. I tak e up that iss ue, a nd exp ress several d o u b ts, at
the end o f this Part.
93
The amount of liti gati o n nee d n ot be e no r m ous in abso lute terms to ge n e r a te a
sign ifica nt benefit in D e la wa re, wh ich has a re lat ive ly sm a li bar. A few hi g h- pmfil e
cases each year can b e ex pected to h ave a CJ'Jcial impact .
9
" See Mace y & M ill e r, supra no te 35, at 504 .
95
! ass ume that b oth th e sh a re ho lder p la intiffs and d irect o r de fendants are li ke ly
to be o ut- of-sta te beca use on ly a smail m inority of the sha re ho lde rs a nd di recto rs
(and o th e r relev ant inte rest gro ups, such as e mpl oyees ) o f pub licl y he ld Deiawa re
corpora tio ns ac tu all y res ide in De lawa re . See, e. g ., Ro m ano, Ge niu s, s upra no te 22,
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ware counsel (rather than, say, engaging local counsel solely for
the purpose of signing pleadings ). 96 On inspection, various aspects of Delaware's judicial process-including, at le ast at first
glance, the unanimity norm-can be seen as satisfying both of
these prerequisites.
As fo r the decision where to file a la\vsuit, the Delaware legislature and judiciary have taken numerous steps that encourage
the parties to bring litigation in the state. For instance, Delaware makes it extremely easy to estab lish person al jurisdiction
over any director of a D elaware firm, and D elaware is notably
generous in awarding fees to plaintiffs' attorneys. 93 Moreover,
the judicial system as a whole-with a separate chancery court
to address business issues and immediate appeal to the supreme
court-is structured to assure judicial expertise and a streamlined decisionmaking process .99 In the fas t-paced takeover battles of the 1980s, Delaware's judges developed a norm of hearing and deciding even the most complex cases in a remarkably
expedited fashion-an obvious attraction to the plaintiffs in
time-sensitive disputes .100
T he remarkable degree of collegial interaction between
Delaware's supreme court justices and the local bar gives outof-state litigants an incentive to rely on Delaware lawyers much
more than they otherwise might. It usually pays to retain a lawyer who knows , and is known and respected by, the supreme
97

at 60 (noting that most Delaware firms are located outside of Delaware).
06
Ribstei n, supra note 88, at 1011.
97
Under De l. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1994), Delaware directors are
deemed to consent to person a l jurisdiction in De laware. Sectio n 3114 was drafted
days after the S upreme Court struck down the pr ior jurisdictional provision as
unconstitution al in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214-17 (1977). See Drexler, in
The De laware Bar, supra note 17, at 597 (describing the change in method of
obtaining jurisdiction).
98
See., e .g. , Rock, supra note 12, at 67 & tbl.2 (discussing Delaware fee awards in
the management buyout cases).
99
See, e .g., Romano, Ge nius, supra note 22, at 39-40.
100
In particu larl y prominent cases, the Delaware supre me court often an nou nced
its decision and issued an order explain in g the result short ly after oral argument, th en
issued a fu ll written opinion thereafter. See, e.g ., Paramount Communica ti o ns v.
QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 36 n.1 (Del. 1993) (oral argument a nd initial order
issued on Dec. 9, 1993; written opin ion issued Feb. 4, 1994). Delaware's judicial
efficiency is not limited to high profile corporate la w cases. Delaware 's justices
disposed of their cases within an average of 24.9 days after submission in fiscal year
1995. Delaware A nnual Report, supra note 21, at 29.
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court. 101 The unanimi ty norrn m agnifies the value of the local
bar. Because of the doctrinal uncertainty the norm creates, it is
even more d ifficult than it might otherwise be for an out-of-state
lawyer to gain an adequate sense of what the justices are up to
simply by reading su preme court opinions.
Jln a very real sense, the local bar, together vvith several
p ro minent New York la-vv fi r:rn.s that have made a similar ongoim:r
· o investment in D elaware law.. h as become a discrete commu.
.
,
, iav;.
,
1o' ,----:
mty o f mterpre
ters o f D
. e1aw.c,:re
corporate
- Jcven 2 cursory
glance through the promi nent takeover cases underscores this.
lime afte r time, one sees the same fir ms representi ng p arties
before the supreme court.
In short, the interest group theory of regulation suggests tha t
the unanimity norm may have evolved, or at least survived, because unanimity benefits the Delaware bar, and the Delaware
supreme court has an incentive to respond to the bar's interests.
Given that both it and the b ar have a strong stake in Delaware's
continued primacy in corporate law, the court is unlikely to
adopt measures that are sufficiently costly to corporations as to
give them reason to reincorporate elsewhere. 103 But unanimity
does not seem likely to have such an effect, and thus the interest
group explanation may appl y.
'While the interest grou p theory rings true in m any respects, it
do es not by itself explain the unanimity norm . First, the benefits of the unanimity norm to the bar are not enormous , and the
practices that foster unanimity entail significant costs to the jusT here is a si milar dynamic in the Supre me Court , wh e re a rel ati vely sm a ll
Su preme Court bar trades on its expertise a nd familiarity with the Justices. As in
De la ware, litigants have a strong incentive to turn to a me mber of this informal bar,
rather than to use an outside attorney w1th iittl e or no ex pe rience in the Supreme
Court. D ue to factors such as those suggeste d in the analysis belm-v, however, the
incentive to use members of the De la ware bar is even stro nger than with the
Supreme Court bar. For a fascinatin g study a nd discuss ion of the Supreme C ourt bar,
see Ke vin T. M cGuire, The Supreme Court Ba r: Lega l E lit ~;s in the Wash ingt on
Community (1993) .
102 One way in which this dyn amic has manifeste d itself in recent years is in firms'
us e of "client memos" both to characterize the De laware decisions, and to indicate in
not so subtle terms the firm' s particuiar expertise o n De laware corporate law. See,
e.g. , Me morandum from Martin Lipton of Wac hteil, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to C lients,
Ten Q uestions Raised by Paramount (Feb. 7, 1994) (on fil e with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
103 See Macey & Miller, supra note 35, at 505 .
10 1
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tices. As we have discussed , D elaware supreme court justices
spend significantly more time on an individual case than would
be required if separate opini ons were the norm . G iven that th e
justice s could , and in the view of some commentators do, look
afte r the corporate bar in other ways at rnuch lower cost,1 it
see ms unlikely th at solicitude for the bar offe rs the final word
on the unani mit y norm.
Second, in addition to the worklo ad costs just m entioned ,
unanimity im poses an other kind of cost o n D elaware's justices- it limits each justice's opportuni ty to develop an individual reputati on. It is much mo re difficult for a justice to establish
an individual voice whe n she has few opportuniti es to spe ak
separately.105 Together these cast significant doubt on the suggestion that unanimity developed, or h as survived , primarily to
benefit Del aware's corpor ate bar.
Thus, we still lack a complete expl an ation of the unanimity
norm. To move closer to this goal, we need to consider another
important, and underap preciated, characteristic of Delaware
supreme court decisionmaking.
()4

An e xampl e comm e nta to rs fr eq ue ntl y po int to is S mi th v. V an G ork o m, 488
A .2d 858 (De l. 1985), a nd oth e r ca ses that have e mp hasize d th e im po rt a nce th e co urt
pl aces on directors ha ving receiv e d exp e rt advice fr o m la wyers and inv estment
b a nkers. Mace y & Mill e r, supra no te 35 , a t 517-1 9. A lth o ugh It is de ba tabl e ho w far
th e interes t gro up expl a nati o n goe s in ex pl a inin g ev en th ese sta tem e nts-a fter a ll ,
lega l and inv e stm e nt banker op inion s presumably do imp rove directors'
de cisi onm aking precess-th e state me nts cost th e court little a nd pro vide obvious
b en e fits to profession a ls.
105 Thi s point ass um es that judicial reputa tion is a n imp o rtant motiv a ting fa ctor fo r
judges, as I beli ev e it is-pa rti cularl y o n a nati o na l co urt o f las t re so rt such as th e
Supreme Court or, for corporate Jaw issu es, th e D e laware supreme court. Judge
Pos ner has suggested th a t "ordinary" judges (such as mos t fed e ra l circuit judges) are
m o tivate d Jess by reputa tion o r e ve n pres tige than by a ta ste fo r voting and by th e
utility th ey gain from their role as e ngage d "s pe ctat ors " of a cas e . Richard A .
Pos ner , W hat D o J udges and Ju stices Ma xim ize? : (T he Sa me T hing E ve rybo dy El se
Do es), 3 Sup. C t. Econ. Rev. 1 (19 93 ). T hi s se e ms de ba tabl e as a ch a racte rization
e ven of " ordinary" judges. But it is interesting to no te th at un a nimity would se em to
re d uce th e utilit y of vo ting to th e ex tent it !imits a judge 's a bility to fully e xpress hi s
o r her voting pre ferences. Thus, th e defection co ncern s I di scuss below would b e
re lev ant eve n for Po;,n e r's mod e l.
100
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IV. THE MORAL DIMENSION OF DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
U nder the standard view of Del aware judicial dccisionmaking, which I have assumed in the an alysis to this poin t, th e una. . norm 'nas trou bl"mg consequences :or
f tne
. cons1stency
.
mnuty
of
corporate law. The standard view suggests tha t lawyers and
commentators should focus on the rules that the suDrerne court
'
an nounces in its cases, and should attempt to reconciie
the
court 's seemingly inconsistent doctrin al pronouncements.
On
this view, the unanimity norm is anything but benign, since it
, .
. .,.
, D l
appe ars to exacer b ate tne: mstabm ty or tn e 1 e ;:rvvare c:ase wv.;-an inst ability which makes it all but hopeless to shoehorn the
supreme court's doctri nal pronouncements into a singie coherent account.
Yet it is far from clear that the traditional perspective accurately describes what Delaware's justices ·are doing when they
decide a corporate law dispute. A closer look suggests a differ en t perspective on Delaware corporate law, one which gives rise
to a richer and more benign account as to why the unanimity
norm evolved in the supreme court.
As Edward Rock has pointed out (in part through a careful
analysis of the Delaware cases involving management buyouts),
Delaware opinions have several striking characteristics that are
largely ignored in the traditional account. 107 First, the court's
j ()"

~

1

10
'' For a few of the more prominent recent efforts to make sense of co rporat e
takeover law, see Lawrence A. Cunn ingham & Ch arles M. Ya blon , Del aware
Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Un ifi e d Standard (and the E nd
o f Revlon Dut ies ?), 49 Bus. Law. 1593 (19 94) (arguing that Delaware is moving
toward a unified sta ndard in all fiduciary duty cases); Lyman J ohnson & David
M illon, The Case Beyond Time , 45 Bus. Law. 2105 (1990) (focusing on directors'
authority to tak e nonshare ho! der consti tu encies into account); Marcel Kahan,
Paramount or Paradox : Th e D elaware Suprem e Court's Takeover J urisprudence, 19
J. Corp. L. 583 (1994) (contend ing that the cases emph as ize a "contingent a llocation
of power" to the directors of a corporation ) . Not s urprisingly , none of these efforts
ca n fully e xp lain the cases.
107
Rock , supra no te 12; see al so Edward B. Rock, Preaching to Managers, 17 J.
Co rp. L. 605 (1992) (reviewing Louis Lowenst ein , Sense a nd Nonsense in Corporate
F inance (1991)). Elsewhe re, I ha ve argued for a som ewhat analogous a pproach to
Delaware law. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Saul and David and Corpora te Takeover
Law (July 1995) (unp ubli shed manuscript on file with the Virginia Law Review
Associat io n). Th e a nalysis of the Time- Warner and QVC decisions that follows is
drawn in part from , a nd further devel o ps, a similar discu ss ion in that article.
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opinions are remark ably na:crat( ve in torm, and tend to include
an extended account of the events that gave rise to the parties'
dispute . tor our purposes, the extended narrative and the
elaborate doctrinal analysis are particularly noteworthy given
,
r
·
,
l
1-lnamrnJ\.Y regimes LO evo ve
the
tena·.• ency ror
courts m
omer
toward short, per curiam o pinions th at offer only the most general reasons for the decision. 108 Second, the court 's narratives
le ave little doubt as to which parties have or have not acted appropriately- that is, of whom the court c1oes and does n ot apnrove .
•
I refer to these tendencies throughout this part as the "moral
~1 .
.
"
•
('
.
mmens10n
m
,D eiaware
corporate 1,avv. \(\9· IJi.n 1ocusmg
on t h e
moral dime nsion, I do not mean to suggest that doctrine is irrelevant to the supreme court's decisionm aking process.
Rather, I contend that doctrine is subsumed by, and in some re spects subordinated to, the supreme court's quasi-m o r al, narrative assessments of whether the directors of a corporation have
or h ave not generally honored their directorial obligations .11 0
There is evidence of the moral characteristics I have described in almost every takeover case. The Time- Warner 111 and
OVC 112 cases offer particularly striking illustrations. In order to
1

•

•

L

•

~

- - -·- --------- - - - - - - - Se e, e.g. , Easterbrook, s up1 a not e 32 , at 810 n .23 (unanimity in continental
courts tends to "reduce [) th e opinion to a stri ng of homilies"); G in sburg, supra note
7, a t 134 (noting t he French practice of iss uin g a single, unanimous opinion, and
stat ing th at those opinions are written in a "formal, impersona l, concise , stylized
manner. " ).
109
One might a lso spe ak in terms of the "narra ti ve dimens ion" of t he De la ware
case law. I use " moral" rath er t han "n arrative" in order to e m p h as ize the quasimora l ton e of the sup reme court's factual na rratives.
110
My account of the mora l dim e nsion in the De iawa re case law ca ll s to mind the
" literary" mo del o f judging developed by Martha 1'\ussbaum, who suggests that
j ud ges s hould act as idea l "spectators," conducting a particularized, yet appropriat e ly
detached, examination of the parties ' circumstances. See, e .g. , Martha C. Nuss b aum,
E quity and IVIercy, 22 P hil. & Pub. Aff. 83 (1993); 1v1artha C. Nussb aum, Poe tic
J ustice: T he L ite rary Imagin a tion and Pubi ic Life 72-77 (1995); Mart h a C. Nussbaum,
P oets as Judges: Judicia l Rhetoric and th e Literary Imagination, 62 U. Chi . L. Rev.
1477 (1995) . One difference between my analy sis and Nussbaum's approC~ch is that
N ussba um has tended to focu s exclusively on the parties in the case a t hand , rather
than on the in structiv e value of a court's opinion for future parties. As will become
clear bel ow, I bel ie ve the Delaware supreme court deci sions take both current and
future parties into consideration .
1 1
571 A .2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
1
112 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
10
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more fully appreciate the moral dimension in the D e laware case
law, and the insights it offers into th e unanimity :n orm , it is useful to consider the cases in slightl y more detail.
W
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As suggested e arlier , Time-1Varner an d O V C seem to mark a
dramatic shift in D elaware 's takeove r jurisprudence .11 3 In Time1-Varner, Time 's directors had investigated possi ble merger partners, including Paramount, fo r several years be fore concluding
that "'¥Varner Brothers was the most promising fi t. 11 " Extensive
negotiations between Time and Warne r led the com panies to
propose a stock-for- stock merger. Before Time js sh areholders
could vote on the proposal, however, P aramo unt m ade an eleventh-hour bid for Time at a much higher price than t he TimeWarner merger offered. After T ime 's directors refused to consider the Paramount bid , and restructured the transaction with
Warner to eliminate Time 's shareho lders' right to vote, 115 Paramount and a group of Time shareholders su ed , alleging that
Time 's directors violated their duties under R evlon and Uno caC16
The Delaware supreme court upheld the Time directors' actions. In addition to concluding that the directors' Revlon duties
were never triggered , the court adopted an exp ansive view of
the " threats" that woul d justify directors' use of defe nsive
measures to stymie an un wanted takeover bid u nder Unocal.
The court concluded tha t a Paramount takeover was a threat to
Time's "culture." This, coupled with the possibility that T ime's
shareholders wo uld be misled by th e bi d , we re adequate reasons
for the directors to stonewall Paramoun t.117
See supra note 75 (describing supreme co urt as shifting in Tim e-Wa rn er, then
shifting again in QVC).
"" Time -Warner, 571 A.2d at 1143-44 (directors considere d Wa rner B ros., D isney,
20th Century Fox, Univ e rsal, Paramount, Columbia, M.G.M., M .C. A., and O rion).
115 The directors silenced Time's shareholders by restructuring the tran sa cti o n from
a stock-for-stock merger, which would have require d a share ho ld e r vote under New
York Stock Exchange rules, to a tender offer by T ime to acquire Vv' a rn e r 's stock . Id .
at 1148-49.
11 6 For a brief overview of these duties, se e supra notes 37-38 and accompanying
text.
11 7
U nder the origina l transacti o n, Warner sh a re holders wo ul d have h e id 62% of
113
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On the surface at least, the facts o:f OVC seem remarkably
similar to those of Timz -'Worner. Like their counterparts at
Time, the Paramount directors had decided to pursue a combination with Viacom as -oari: of a Iong-term plan fo r the ftiture of
Paramount. 118 \\/hen cy\;c :responded to the Paramount-Viacom
transaction by making its o vrn bid for Paramount, Paramoun t's
,.
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it did in Time- \Varner, the ne.t a\vare supreme court hel d that
Paramount's directors violated thei.r fiduci ary duties by refusing
to consi der the QVC bid. 11 9 The OVC court repeatedly empha·size d that a consummated Viacom transaction would give
Viacom's chief executive a controlling interest in the comb ine d
company, thereby eliminating Paramount's shareholders' voice
in corporate affairs .120
From a doctrinal perspective, Time- ~Varner and QVC are extremely difficult to reconcile.m A s a result, most commentators
view OVC as embodying a doctrinal shift. If we focus on the
supreme court's quasi-moral narrative accounts of the directors '
performance in the two cases, however- that is, on the moral
dimension of the cases- the divergent outcomes seem less surr-.- ' "

1

.1.

the stock o f the co mbi ned company. and thus a co ntro lling inte rest. Even so, the
court he ld that this was not enoug h to trigge r Revlon dutie s. Time-Warner, 571 A .2d
at 1149-54.
'' 8 QVC, 637 A.2d at 38 .
O ne of the ironies of Time -Wa rn er and QVC is that
Para mo unt not only was inv o lv ed in both cases, first as the hos tile bidder and then as
th e target, but that it also lost in the supre me court both times .
9
"
Id. at 48-50. Whereas the court held in Time- Warn er th at Time's directors nev er
beca me subj ect to Del awar e's stringen t Revlon duti es, Tim e-Warner, 571 A.2d a t
1150-51 , it he ld tha t bo th Revlon and Unocal applied in QVC, an d that Paramount's
directors failed to sa ri sfy th e ir ob ligat ions !.inder th ese cases. QVC, 637 A.2d at 49.
'~ 0 See , e.g., QVC, 637 A .2d at 42 -43.
'~' T he most pe rsuasive attempt to do so, in my vi ew, is Marcel Kahan's
characte ri zation o f th e takeo ver cases as entailing a "co ntin ge nt allocat ion of
a uth ority" to the directors of a corpora tion. See Ka han, supra note 106 . But even
this vi ew must stretch to reconcii e Time -Warner a nd QVC. Thus , to explain th e
success of Time's directors a nd fai lure of Paramount's, t he a pproach e mp hasizes th e
fac t th at Time's sharehol ders theoret i c~{lly couid have received a takeover pr e mium
ev en a fter the Time- Warner merger, whe re as Para mount' s share ho lders would ha ve
lost a ny chance of a subseq ue nt ta keove r premi um once Sumner Redstone of V iacom
too k co ntro l. Id. at 596. T hi s is true, but th e p rospect o f a subsequent ch a nge in
co ntrol with Time-Warn er was much mo re theore ti cal than real, give n th e size of the
co mbin e d compan y and its e normous debt loa d.
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prising even in the face of doctrinal instability.
Consider how different Time-lVa:-n er and OVC begin to look
if we put doctrine to the side and fo cus on the moral dimension
of the opinions . In Tim e- Warne r, T ime' s directors' refusal even
to consider the Paramo unt b id cle arl y was problematic, but it
was a single aberration in wh at the su prem e court characte rizes
h • .,
as tne mrectors oU1erw1se acrrnratHe p er to rmance or t 1e1r a uties. For instance , th e directors h ad consid ered several o ther
fi rms carefully, includ ing P aramount , b efo re choosing 'vVarne r.
As th.e court underscores , thei r consideration was given long be fore Paramount m ade its last min ute bid.l 22
T hough superficially similar, the actions of Paramount's direc-tors are portrayed very differently in QVC. Chief Justice
Veasey's opinion in OVC leaves no dou bt that Paramount's de cisionmaking process was largely a charade, designed to disguise
the directors' failure to honor their responsibilities as directors.
For instance, although P aramount's directors characterized their
merger wi th Viacom as part of a long-term plan, the supreme
court points out that the negotiations had a relatively recent
genesis.m Moreover, Paramount's directors never seriously considered whether a combination with QVC would make sense.
Quite to the contrary, a chief objective of their actions seemed
to be to exclude QVC from the nrocess
at all costs. 12 _. The Para_,
mount directors ' abdicati on of their responsibilities required the
supreme court to ste p in, in contras t to the deference it accorded
T ime's directors in the Time- 01arner case.
Focusing on the moral dimension of D elaware decisionmak·~
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" 2 The court begins by no ting that " [a ]s earl y as 1983 a nd 1984 [six years before the
tra nsact io n with Warner was finalized], Time 's ex ecutive board began considering
expa nding Time's opera tions into the entertainment industry. " Time- Warn er, 571
A .2d at 1143. T he court then proceeds to describe the committee and full bo a rd
meetings that ev e ntua lly le d th e directors to Warner. ld. at 1143-46.
12; QVC, 637
A.2d a t 38 (" A lthough Paramount had considered a possibl e
co m bination of Paramount and Viacom as early as 1990, recent efforts to exp lore
such a transaction began _.. on April 20, 1993. ").
12 " Thus,
the opinion e mp hasizes the rep e ated efforts by Martin Davis ,
Paramount's chief executive , to dissuade QVC from making a bid. See, e .g., id . at 38
(Davis "told [Q VC's ch ief exe cutive] Diller._. th a t Paramo unt was not for sa le. " )T he opin ion further e mp hasizes tha t Paramount's directors never made a se rious
effort to evaluate the QV C bid. !d. at 41 (board me mbers were given a " document
summarizing the 'conditi o ns a nd uncertainties' of QY C's offer.").
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ing thus provides a mu ch more satisfying account of the decisions in Time -VVarner and OVC than doctrine alone. It also
raises an important question: Is my emphasis on the supreme
court's role as moral arbiter sim ply another way of saying that
the justices decide •.vhat they think the outcome shoul d be and
slan t the facts to supuort fhei r conclusion ? 125 Could not the
court have reached different results in Time- 1JVa rner an d O VC
by simply shifting its characterization of a f ev1 of the facts? Perh aps by emphasizing 'rime 's directors' refu sal to consider the
P aram ount bid in Time- 1Narner, for instance, and Paramount's
careful negotiations with Viacom in QVC?
Given the fact-sen sitive natu re of the take over cases, Delaware 's justices clearly co uld do just this . Yet it is also clear that
the justices see themselves as doing much more than playing
games with facts . If the justices were principally concerned wi th
defending an intuitive conclusion, they could easily achieve this
wi th a brief, selective presentation of facts together with an application of takeover doctrine. T he opinions take an altogether
different tack. A s I have already noted, they provide a re markably detailed narrative of the events surrounding each dispute , so that the case becomes an extensive story about the parties' interactions.126 The clear implication is that the story of the
case is intended to be instructive , to illustrate 'Nhat appropriate
or inappropriate directo rial behavior "feels " like. 127
•

1

T he court's decisionm ak in g has in fact been critici zed in precisely these terms.
See, e.g., Dennis J. Block, Step he n A. R adin & Myrna S. Lev ine, The Business
Judgment Rule in Shareholder Derivative and Takeover Litigation, in Twentieth
Ann ual Institute on Securities Regu lation 891, 963 (Char les M. Na tha n , Harvey L.
Pitt & Ste phe n R. Yo lk eds., 1988); Do uglas M. Branson , T he C ha ncell or's Foot in
De laware: Schn ell and it s Proge ny, 14 J. Co rp. L. 515 (1989).
126
Another possible explanatio n of the court's detailed narratives is that lengt h y
factual accounts are a me ans of disguising differences of opini on amo ng the justices
in a difficult case, much as convo lu ted doctrinal accounts ca n disguise different views
as to th e appropriate doctrinal structure (as we saw in Part II). Although this
exp lanat ion strikes me as plausible and probably partially accurate, my own view is
tha t the court's factual narratives tend, on balan ce , to increase the instructive value of
its opin ion s; that is, the y counteract rat her than contribute to the doctrinal inst ab ility
we consid ered earlier.
127
In another article, I use the Biblica l accounts of Sau l and David to explore in
more detail the benefits of an extended narrative, as compared to a more economical
description of background facts , in providing guidance for si mil arl y situated parties in
the future. See Skeel, supra note 107, at 30-32. The Delaware supreme court 's use of
125
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The unmistakably moral tone of the supreme court's opinions
strongly reinforces this cond usion .128 The QVC opinion provides a vivid illustration . A t the end of the opinion, the court
added a separate addendu m for the sole purpose of chastising
Joe Jamail, the attorney fo r one of Paramount's directors, for
his behavior at a deposition in connection with the case. 129 1 he
addendum announces in no un certain terms that the D elaware
supreme court sees itself as h avi ng an important moral role in
corporate law. I "' 0

extended narrativ e, a nd its e mpha sis o n te llin g d eta ils , are key co mpo ne nts o f what
Judge Posner characteri zes as t he "sty le " of the op inion s. See Richard A. Posner,
Jud ges' Writing Style s (And Do They Ma tter?), 62 U . C hi . L. Rev . 1421, 1422-23
(1995).
An obvi o us concern with this approach is th at it may app ea r to disgui se t he
co nteste d nat ure of any acco unt o f th e fac tu a l circumstances und e rl ying a dispute by
suggesting that the justices ca n di st ill the parties ' behavior to a single, objective
narr ative . E ven if the narrative is d eba tabl e in its particulars, ho wever , presenting a
single authoritative account provides far more guid a nce to future parti es than a more
hed ge d, openly uncertai n one wo uld. In view of thi s, so lo ng as the court 's account is
general ly accura te, as clearly is true of De lawa re suprem e court o pini ons, the use of
an a uthorita ti ve narrativ e may prove especia ll y va luabi e eve n if it appe ars to gloss
ov er factual uncerta inti es in some re spe cts. No tice that the same poin t ca n be made
in con nectio n with the legal story telling movement. Although proponen ts of legal
storytelling have bee n appropriate ly crit icized for adop ti ng a postmod e rn skepticism
toward truth , whil e at the same time implyin g th at their ow n narrativ es are ''true, "
see, e .g., David A. Skee l, Jr. , Pract icing Poetry, Teaching Law, 92 M ich . L. Rev. 1754,
1769 & n.56 (1994) (bo o k review) (citing Jane B. Baro n , Resista nce to Stori es, 67 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 255 (1994)), t he narra tiv es m ay hav e o bvi ous inst ructi ve va lu e eve n if
th ey are to so me extent inaccurate.
128 See supra notes 107-110 a nd accom panying tex t.
129 QVC, 637 A.2 d at 51 -57 .
After declaring th a t " [o ]ne particular inst ance of
mi sco ndu ct during a de position in thi s case demonstrate s such an astonishi ng lack of
profession alism a nd civility th at it is worthy of sp ecial note here as a less on for th e
future-a lesson of co nduct not to be tolerated o r repeated," id . a t 52 , the supreme
court quotes several of Jamail's off-co lor outbursts in th e deposition. The addendum
is a ll the mo re re markable given th at Jamail had not b ee n admitted pro ha c vice in
th e case, a nd thu s, the supreme co urt had no jurisdiction ove r him . Id . at 52 .
130 Del aware 's judges a lso have emphasize d t he moral dimension of corporate law
outside of th e judicia l co ntext. See, e.g ., William T. A ll en, Independent Directors in
MBO Transacti ons : Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 Bus . Law. 2055, 2061, 2063 (1990)
(D e laware C han ce llor describing the importance of inde pen dent directors' "se nse of
duty ").
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B. Unanimity and the A1oral Dimension
Re conceptualizing corporc.te law in moral terms has seve ral
im portan t impiications for our analysis of Delaware's unanim ity
norm . T he firs t is that it suggests doctrinal cycling m ay not be
so 2:rave a concern as might otherwise be the case . One:: v,;e
r::oe •)or.i 7 "' t }-.;:1 + +he C11Dro rn e CO''rt ' s ·prl"ncl"pal focu..;: i::: o n w h "'·l' 1,?T
the targe t directo rs have fa ithfully performed their resp onsibil:t·ties, rather than on doctrine alone, the cases are more coh erent
than the y initially appear . Although Time -1-Varner and QVC' arr::
t.,
f ,. h
1
Peruaus tne mos t stnKmg Llustrat10ns o tms, t .e moral De:r soc::c -·
tive has similar explanatory power in each of the suprenv;;
.
,_
l'l
court ' s promment
taKeover
cases . ~
Recognizing the moral dimension of the Delaware cases has a
seco nd crucial implication: It helps to explain why Delaware de cisionmaking has evolved toward unanimity. Far more than a
regime characterized by separate opinions, unanimity reinfo rces
the supreme court's effectiveness as moral arbiter-that is , in
illuminating how directors ought to act. If the court regu larl y
issued separate opinions, the justices' internal disagreem ents
would dil ute the impact of the court's pronouncements, and
suggest uncertainty as to the parameters of appropriate directorial behavior. m B y speaking instead with a single voice , the justices send a very different message , one that suggests that the
full authority of the court stands behind the conclusi ons th at
they reach as to appropriate and inappropriate directori al be-·
havl."._,Ar t.; 3
~/
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Fo r a n extended an a lysis of the De laware supreme court's (and chan cery
cou rt's) management bu yo ut cases in these terms , see Rock, supra note 12.
t.'~ G ive n the norm of unanimity , the issuance of a 5eparate opinion has a powe rful
sig nailin g e ffect , since it hints a t deep disagreement on the court in those fe w cases
whe re a justice does write se parately. This is particularly tru e if the separa te o pini on
ch a ll e nges the majority 's factual narrative, rather than simply regist e ring a
di sagree me nt on a procedural or doctrinal point. See generally Paul G e wirtz,
Narrativ e and Rhetoric in th e Law, in Law's Stories: Narrativ e and Rhetoric in th e
Law 2, 11 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (multiple opinions cont a ining
diverge nt factual narrative s undermine the credibility of any part icular accoun t o f
rea lity). Fo r a rare illustration in the Delaware case Jaw, see Smith v. Van Gork o m ,
488 A. 2d 858,893-98 (1985) (McNei ll y, J., dissenting) (ext e nded recharacterizati o n o f
facts und e rl ying decision wh ere majority held directors to hav e breached th e ir dut y
of care) .
t.'> Thi s d o es not mean th a t the s upreme court 's standards e merge instantl y. As
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Notice that the importance of unanimity to the court's role as
moral arbiter may also help to explain why the Delaware supreme court, unlike the United States Supreme Court, has continued to maintain unanimity long after having established its
pre emine nce in corporate law. _t.ven if the court's legitimacy is
clear, unanimity remains important to the moral dimension in
the D elaware cases.
M oreover, D ela\vare's justi ces may not be as certain of their
status as I have su ggeste d . Although Dela-ware has long been
recognized as the de facto nation al regulator of corporate law ,
there is an obvious irony in the fact that the five jus tices of the
supreme court of one of our sm allest states wield control over
the nation 's largest corporations. Delaware's justices are a'Nare
both of the irony of their status, and of the continu al threa t that
much or all of corporate law could be federalized at any time . ~
T his perspective suggests that both the unanimity norm and
the moral dimension in Delaware law may be responses to the
justices' understandable concerns about judicial legitimacy. 135
By staking out a position as moral arbiter, and speaking with a
single voice, the court reinforces its authoritative status in corporate law. Thus, unlike the Supreme Court, whose credibility
is sufficiently well-established that the Justices nee d speak with
a unanimous voice only on particularly controversial issues,
D elaware's justices m aintain unanimity as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the court's legitimacy.
Inte restingly, this judicial legit imacy story appears to draw
support from a marked increase in the prominence of the moral
dimension in the Delaware cases in recent years. T o the extent
13

Rock has shown in the management buyout context, the supreme court often
develops its norms of conduct over time when a new issue emerges. See Rock, supra
note 12. Rather than suggesting unchanging standards, the point is that the supreme
court is likely to be unanimous in its pronouncements at each step along the way.
The standards may evolve, but the court's commitment to unanimity does not change.
134 Chief Justice Veasey's almost apologetic conclusion to the QVC decision can be
seen as an evidence of this. QVC, 637 A.2d at 51 ("It is the nature of the j udicial
process that we decide only the case before us .... The holding o f this case ... should
provide a workable precedent .... ").
135
See generally Patricia M. Wa ld, The Rhetoric of Re su lts and the Resuits of
Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1371, 1372 (1995) ("modern judges
write opinions ... to reinforce our oft-challenged and arguably shaky authority to tell
others what to do ." ). My thanks to Ed Rock for suggesting that l pursue this line of
mqUiry.
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judici al insecurity has contributed to the moral tone of the cases ,
one would expect the moral dimension to be strongest in a time
o f particular concern about credibility. This in fact appears to
be true. Th e moral dimension in the Delaware case law became
most pronounced in the ta keover decision s we have been con side ring , starting in the mi d-1980s. T he 1980s were a time of
particular concern for Delaware, in vi ew of the repeated calls
for a federal response to the takeo ve r phenomenon.
\;Vhen we combine the analysis of th is Part with the an al ysi s of
the previous Parts, what emerges is a complex picture of the role
that unanimity plays in Delaware corporate law.1' 6 The interest
group analysis, th ou gh problem atic, partially explains the emergence of the unanimity norm . But in order to more fully explain
th e norm, we need to consider the moral dime nsion in D el av;are
corporate law, and the importance of unanimity to the co urt 's
role in fostering appropriate directorial behavior. However persuasive the accou nt I have developed may be, it is also important not to forget a far more basic factor-Delaware's justices
shoulder the added costs of unanimity because they take their
responsibilities as justices very seriously, and because the legal
culture in Delaware rei nforces this.137

A s th e compl exity o f th e norm suggests, Del aware's penchant for unanimity is
ne ith er obvi o usly e ffici ent or o bvi o usly inefficient. The recent lit erature on norms
suggests that e ffici e nt no rms are like ly to eme rge in groups th a t are characterized by
repeated interacti o n and which internalize the effects of a norm , see, e.g., Robert D .
Coo ter, Dece ntralize d Law for a Complex Economy: T he Structural A pproach to
Adjudicatin g the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa . L. Rev. 1643, 1657-64 (1 996), whereas
th e ab ility to externa lize costs and fact o rs such as cognitive distort ions can le ad to
in e fficient norms, see, e.g. , Eric A. Posn e r, Law, Eco nomics and Ine fficient Norms, 144
U. Pa. L. Re v. 1697, 1711-25 (1996). A lthough De laware's de pend e nce o n attractin g
corporations suggests th a t the court must internalize the consequences of the un animity
norm , there is li ke ly to be sufficient slack to e nabl e it to be nefit De laware
constituenci es, as we saw in Part III.
137
Th is was re peatedl y e mphasized to me in m y conv e rsati ons with severa l
Del aware justices.
1 6
'
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CONCLUS ION

The literature on Delaware corporate law is enormous, and
includes both a prominent theoretical debate on Delaware's
status as the leading state of incorporation , and ongoing efforts
to make sense of the Del;rware supreme court's Dronouncements on co:rpDrate lcP~v. It therefore comes as a surprise thai: so
few of these cmn rnentators have so much as noticed the re• wltn
• ., -vvrnch tt1e
• supreme court cec1Ges
' • 1 rts
•
mar k a bl e regu l c:1nty
cases by a uruJ.nimo us vo te.
1
'
•
•
~ · e1aware s unamm1ty norm sneas nnporA s we h ave seen, D
tant light on the nature of Delaware corporate law. First, focusing on unanimity and the effect it may have on doctrinal cycling hel ps to explain why the D elaware case law, which.
commentators repeatedly characterize as stable and certain, has
at times appeared to be anything but stable and certain. Our
consideration of why D el<l'Nare's supreme court has m ai ntained
a unanimity norm offers additional insights, suggesting that the
unanimity norm provides some support for a lawyer-centered
perspective, and much more support for a moral perspective on
Delaware coruorate lavv .
More generally, the analysis has highlighted some of the effects of unanimity on judicial decisionmaking. In addition to
magnifying the likelihood of doctrinal cycling, and producing
analogous effects even in the absence of a true cycle, unanimity
is likely to significantly alter the decisionmaking process within
any given case. -~ he analysis underscores just how differently
unanimous and nonunanimous courts behave, both within each
case and across doctrines such as those that have been the focus
of this Article.
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APPENDIX A:
DELAWARE S UPREi'v·IE COURT DECISIONMAKING
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' O nl y re po rted decisio ns were ava ilabl e from 1960-73.
' O ne of these was a corporate law decision. T he court iss ued se parate op inions in
15 corpora te cases overa ll.
' Se veral cas es included bo th conc urrences and d issents. I have trea ted these as
di sse nts.
The data used in compiling these charts was obta in ed by running severa l searc hes
in WESTLA W's DE-CS data bas e. The numb er o f tota l d isposition s in a yea r was
o bta in ed by running th e searc h "Co( hi gh) & DA(19xx) ," where 60-95 were subs tituted for "xx" in consccuti,; e searches. The numb e r of published decision s in a yea r
was obtained by addi ng to each total disposition search th e qualifier "% ((tab le /6
published) ( table /2 captione d) ) ." Th is search e limi nated nearly all of the unp u bli shed decisions. Rema ind ers were eliminated by browsing the search re sults in "C I"
mode. The num ber of dissen ts an d co ncurrences in a year was obtained by add in g to
each total disposition search the qualifier "& disse nt! concur!. " The search results
were then browsed to confirm that each was in fact a concurrence or d iss en t. Eac h
case where a concurr e nce or d isse nt did in fact appear was loosely cate gorized by
type of case at this time .

